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Article 
The Tipping Point of Federalism 
AMY L. STEIN 
As the Supreme Court has noted, “it is difficult to conceive of a more basic 
element of interstate commerce than electric energy, a product that is used in 
virtually every home and every commercial or manufacturing facility.  No state 
relies solely on its own resources in this respect.”  And yet, the resources used 
to generate this electricity (e.g., coal, natural gas, or renewables) are 
determined largely by state and local authorities through their exclusive 
authority to determine whether to approve construction of a new electricity 
generation facility.  As the nation finds itself faced with important decisions 
that directly implicate the source of our electricity, including climate change 
and grid reliability, the proper functioning of a system of exclusive state 
control over the siting of electricity generation is increasingly strained.   
Continued state control over the siting of electricity generation is 
particularly curious when viewed in relation to other infrastructure siting 
regimes.  This Article traces the evolution of authority governing the siting of 
railroads, natural gas pipelines, wireless telecommunications, and electricity 
transmission, finding that they share many of the same federalism justifications 
for centralized control that exist in the siting of electricity.  Yet, in every case 
except for electricity generation, Congress tipped the balance of power to 
allow for more federal authority over these siting decisions.   
This Article explores this disparity between state control over the siting of 
electricity generation and enhanced federal control in the other siting regimes.  
It concludes that this disparity may be at least partially explained by more 
initiative on the part of relevant federal agencies.  Whereas federal agencies 
played a minimal role in affecting the tensions caused by increasing national 
interests in the other infrastructure regimes, federal agencies are taking 
significant steps to further the national interest in the siting of electricity 
generation.  These actions can reduce the pressure to formally alter the 
federalism balance through congressional action, and can play a key role in 
the broader federalism literature surrounding the circumstances that foster tips 
from state towards federal authority.   
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AMY L. STEIN
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the Supreme Court has noted, “it is difficult to conceive of a more 
basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy, a product used 
in virtually every home and every commercial or manufacturing facility.  
No state relies solely on its own resources in this respect.”1  And yet, the 
resources used to generate this electricity (e.g., coal, natural gas, or 
renewables) are determined largely by state and local authorities through 
their exclusive authority to determine whether to approve construction of a 
new electricity generation facility.
2
  
The physical equipment of a modern electric power system is divided 
into three basic categories: generation, transmission, and distribution.  
Generation refers to the conversion of one form of energy to electric 
energy, a process that often occurs through the burning of fossil fuels to 
produce steam to spin a turbine at a power plant.  Transmission refers to 
the transfer of electric energy over an interconnected group of lines and 
equipment at high voltages from its place of origin to distribution lines.  
Distribution refers to the final stage in delivery of low voltage electricity to 
the end users.  For purposes of this Article, the focus is on the jurisdiction 
over the “siting of electricity generation,” defined as the authority to 
determine whether to approve construction of a new electricity generation 
facility (often a power plant) which necessarily entails an assessment of the 
resources used by the facility to generate electricity, as well as 
determinations about location.
3
     
                                                                                                                          
*Associate Professor, Tulane University School of Law.  The author thanks Washington and Lee 
Law School for sponsoring the 2012 conference on “Reclaiming Environmental Federalism” and her 
co-panelists, Bill Buzbee and Rob Glicksman for their comments.  Thanks to Keith Werhan, Adam 
Feibelman, Claire Dickerson, Shu-yi Oei, Saru Matambanadzo, and Alfred Light for their support and 
thoughtful comments and to the tireless research of Emily Russell, Katy Whisenhunt, Gillian Egan, and 
Rick Eisenstat.  
1 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982). 
2 In 1935, Congress explicitly reserved the authority over all electricity siting decisions with 
respect to generation, transmission, and distribution facilities to the states.  Federal Power Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012).  
3 It is worth noting that jurisdiction over these three areas is complex, and any analysis depends 
on whether the focus is on jurisdiction over the service or the physical infrastructure.  For example, 
FERC has jurisdiction over the rates charged to transmit electricity (the transmission service), but states 
retain jurisdiction over the siting of the transmission lines themselves (the physical infrastructure).  For 
generation, the jurisdictional split is even more complex.  On the service side, FERC has jurisdiction 
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In 1935, Congress codified this state control in the amendments to the 
Federal Power Act (FPA).  The FPA provides the states with exclusive 
authority to regulate all siting decisions with respect to electric energy 
generation facilities.
4
  This places significant power with the state 
legislatures, whose laws govern the decision making of the state public 
utility commissions regarding the type of power supply approved for a 
given area.
5
  Many states have delegated siting authority to more local 
levels of government, and the regulatory requirements and number of 
jurisdictions involved differs substantially depending on the size of the 
facility and the state where the generating facility is proposed.
6
  As the 
D.C. Circuit has noted, “State and municipal authorities retain the  
right . . . to require retirement of existing generators, to limit new 
construction to more expensive, environmentally-friendly units, or to take 
any other action in their role as regulators of generation facilities without 
direct interference from the [Federal Energy Regulatory] Commission.”7  
This exclusive state authority over the siting of generation has been 
affirmed repeatedly by courts.
8
 
                                                                                                                          
over the rates charged for electricity generated and sold for resale (wholesale rates), and states retain 
jurisdiction over the rates charged to end users (retail rates).  On the infrastructure side, states retain 
jurisdiction over the siting of the electricity generation itself.  Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.  
§ 824(b)(1). 
4 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).  
5 See, e.g., Dave Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: 
A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15, 44–46 (2012) (discussing the Indiana 
PUC’s and South Dakota PUC’s approval of new coal-fired power plants and the Florida PUC’s denial 
of two new pulverized coal generating units based on questionable cost effectiveness due to potential 
carbon controls). 
6 See, e.g., ENVTL. L. INST., STATE ENABLING LEGISLATION FOR COMMERCIAL-SCALE WIND 
POWER SITING AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ROLE 1, 5–20 (2011), available at 
http://www.elistore.org/reports_detail.asp?ID=11410 (categorizing the fifty states into differing degrees 
of authority, including local authority, dual authority, and state authority over the siting of wind 
energy). 
7 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
8 Id.; see also Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 389 (1988) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“FERC does not, after all, have any jurisdiction over a utility that simply builds its own 
generating facility and retails the electricity.”); Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 
F.3d 667, 718 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that “petitioners correctly point out that section 201(b) of the 
[FPA] denies FERC jurisdiction over ‘facilities used for the generation of electric energy’” but also 
noting that this jurisdiction is limited by FERC’s authority to “exercise jurisdiction over generation 
facilities to the extent necessary to regulate interstate transmission”).  Federal regulation of the siting of 
electricity generation extends only to hydroelectric and nuclear power determinations.  See Uma Outka, 
Siting Renewable Energy: Land Use and Regulatory Context, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1041, 1047 (2010) 
(noting “nuclear facilities are subject to extensive federal regulation, from siting to decommissioning, 
that does not apply to renewable resources”).  FERC has jurisdiction over licensing of non-federal 
hydroelectric projects if the project meets one of four criteria. Jurisdiction Determination, FERC, 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/comp-admin/jur-deter.asp (last visited June 23, 
2012); see also 16 U.S.C. § 817(1) (requiring a federal permit to develop electric power or construct a 
dam in or incidental to any navigable waters of the United States). 
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State or local control
9
 over generation siting functioned adequately, 
more or less, for over seventy years.  But as the nation finds itself faced 
with important decisions that directly implicate the source of our 
electricity, the proper functioning of exclusive state control over electricity 
siting is becoming increasingly strained.  Electricity demand continues to 
rise.  The vast majority of our electricity comes from cheap, domestic, and 
reliable fossil fuels, namely coal and natural gas.  Combustion of these 
same fossil fuels are the primary contributors to the world’s greenhouse 
gas emissions,
10
 increasing the scrutiny on the nation’s continued reliance 
on these sources of electricity generation.   
Even though the legislative branch has failed to pass comprehensive 
legislation to address climate change, the executive and judicial branches 
have recognized the importance of moving towards reliance on cleaner 
sources of electricity generation, including renewable energy and energy 
efficiency.  In 2007, the Supreme Court acknowledged the perils of climate 
change and the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
regulate carbon dioxide as a pollutant.
11
  In 2009, the Obama 
Administration issued a call for renewable energy to supply twenty-five 
percent of the nation’s electricity by 2025,12 and in his joint address to 
Congress, President Obama stated that “[the U.S.] will double [the] 
nation’s supply of renewable energy in the next three years,” a prediction 
that has failed to be achieved.
13
 As a result, complex trade-offs involving 
cost, reliability, national security, and the environment are infused into 
decisions regarding the siting of electricity generation.  
At first blush, state or local control over the siting of electricity 
generation may not be surprising.  Siting decisions, after all, are ones that 
require localized input and whose impacts are felt most by the immediate 
community.  But this state or local control over the siting of electricity 
                                                                                                                          
9 Many scholars make a distinction between state and local levels of government for federalism 
purposes.  See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
4, 21–25.  For purposes of this analysis, however, the key distinction is between federal and sub-federal 
levels of government, allowing state and local levels of government to be grouped together on the 
decentralized side of the federalism ledger.  
10 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
AND SINKS: 1990–2010 ES-7 (2012), available at  
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf 
(“As the largest source of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 from fossil fuel combustion has 
accounted for approximately 78 percent of GWP-weighted emissions since 1990, growing slowly from 
77 percent of total GWP-weighted emissions in 1990 to 79 percent in 2010.  Emissions of CO2 from 
fossil fuel combustion increased at an average annual rate of 0.4 percent from 1990 to 2010.”). 
11 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). 
12 President Obama Calls for Greater Use of Renewable Energy, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Jan. 21, 
2009), http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/news/printable_versions/news_detail.html?news_id=12194.   
13 President Barack Obama, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery Address to Joint Session of 
Congress (Feb. 24, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-
President-Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-Session-of-Congress. 
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generation becomes a little more curious when viewed in comparison to 
other commonplace infrastructure siting regimes.   
The siting of infrastructure in this country has experienced an 
evolution in its federal balance.  Decisions regarding whether and where to 
locate railroads, natural gas pipelines, wireless telecommunications, and 
electricity transmission (“infrastructure regimes”) were all originally 
committed to state or local authority.  Despite their traditionally local 
nature, an increasing number of factors began to suggest that more 
centralized control was needed.  In each of the siting regimes, one or more 
of the five traditional justifications for federal control became apparent.  
Some involved externalities that were caused by interstate issues, some 
could not function effectively without some uniform standards or 
harmonization, some raised concerns that states were under-regulating, 
some raised concerns that states were over-regulating, and some needed to 
pool resources to reach their full potential.  Each of these infrastructure 
siting regimes reached a point where state or local control was no longer 
the most effective method of siting.  The regimes reached a “tipping point” 
where the pressure points pushing towards more centralized control 
eventually coincided with the proper political atmosphere.  A “tipping 
point of federalism” is defined for purposes of this Article as congressional 
action that formally shifts the balance of power from state or local control 
to some form of enhanced federal control.
14
  In every case except for 
electricity generation, Congress tipped the balance of power to allow for 
more federal authority over these siting decisions. 
Given this history, one might expect to see the same in the siting of 
electricity generation.  Like the other infrastructures, the siting of 
electricity generation began under state or local control.  And like the other 
infrastructures, a number of federalism pressure points are beginning to 
challenge the traditional level of governance.  First, although the siting of 
one power plant within state lines is not as overt as an interstate issue—as 
compared to the siting of railroad lines, natural gas pipelines, or 
transmission lines that traverse through multiple states—electricity itself is 
an item of interstate commerce and the way that it is generated has 
pollution impacts with interstate implications.  Second, national energy 
                                                                                                                          
14 This Article does not allege to be a comprehensive assessment of all federalism tips involving 
siting decisions.  That assessment, which should include authority between the federal and subfederal 
systems specific to siting schemes such as nuclear waste disposal sites, landfills, hydroelectric (FERC-
dominated), and hydrokinetic (FERC-Bureau of Energy Management cooperative) siting, as well as 
analyses of tips from state to federal power in other non-siting contexts, and tips from federal to state 
power.  For example, in response to the 1973 Oil Embargo, Congress passed the 1974 Emergency 
Highway Energy Conservation Act that established a national speed limit only to repeal the law over 
twenty years later to tip power back to the states.  For further discussion, see Daniel Albalate & 
Germán Bel, Speed Limits in America: Economics, Politics and Geography 5 (Institut de Recerca en 
Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública, Working Paper, 2010).   
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policies focused on renewable energy are conflicting with state laws 
providing preference for fossil fuels.  This can support arguments that 
states are overregulating in ways that make it difficult for renewable 
energy to be sited within their borders.  Conversely, the decision by 
twenty-one of our fifty states not to adopt binding renewable portfolio 
standards can be characterized as an example of the third justification, 
under-regulation, allowing fossil fuel generators to flock to the states with 
the least restrictive requirements or allowing states to free ride on the 
social benefits of renewable energy located in other states.  And lastly, the 
potential dangers associated with a non-diversified fuel supply and 
accompanying threats to reliability of our national grid evoke discussions 
of the need to pool resources to protect national security. 
Despite shared justifications for more enhanced federal authority 
across all the siting regimes, control over the siting of electricity generation 
remains firmly in the hands of the state and local authorities.  This Article 
explores this disparity between the siting regimes to determine whether 
there is an explanation unique to the siting of electricity.  A number of 
factors may exist to counter one or more of these federalism justifications 
in support of centralized power, including an argument that Congress 
would have a more difficult time asserting constitutional authority over the 
siting of electricity generation than it did in asserting authority over the 
other infrastructure regimes.  Although this authority would likely stem 
from the Commerce Clause, defending this constitutional authority is not 
the purpose of this analysis.
15
  Instead, this analysis assumes that Congress 
would have the authority to regulate the siting of electricity generation if it 
so chose to do so.   
For purposes of this analysis, however, three counterarguments seem 
particularly noteworthy.  First, this Article assesses whether the 
decentralized control over the siting of electricity generation realizes some 
                                                                                                                          
15 Although construction of the Commerce Clause has changed over the years that are covered in 
this tip analysis, a strong argument exists that even under the more constrained interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause that currently prevails, Congress’s power to regulate purely intrastate activities that 
“substantially affect interstate commerce” could encompass the siting of electricity generation.  See 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (providing a wide variety of examples of economic 
activity that has been held to substantially affect interstate commerce).  Although the purely intrastate 
siting of electricity generation does not cross over state lines, as do railroads, natural gas pipelines, and 
transmission, it has at least as “substantial” of an effect on interstate commerce as the siting of 
intrastate wireless towers.  Id.  For a fuller assessment of Congress’s authority over energy, see Robin 
Kundis Craig, Constitutional Contours for the Design and Implementation of Multistate Renewable 
Energy Programs and Projects, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 771, 780–81 (2010) (discussing the resilience of 
energy regulation legislation under the Commerce Clause and repeated failed challenges of the 
constitutionality of such legislation); Sandeep Vaheesan, Preempting Parochialism and Protectionism 
in Power, 49 HARV. J.  LEGIS. 87, 128–29 (2012) (noting Congress’s broad authority to regulate the 
electric power sector even under modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence and quoting the Supreme 
Court’s dicta that the electric utility industry is “so fused and interdependent that the whole enterprise 
is within the reach of Congress” (quoting Conn. Light & Power v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 515, 
529–30 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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critical federalism virtues that the other siting regimes do not.  Second, it 
explores whether authority remains with the states and localities because 
electricity siting decisions are uniquely decisions of a “traditionally local 
nature.”  Lastly, it considers whether elements of public choice theory can 
explain why rational, self-interested federal legislators may not see fit to 
tip the balance of power of electricity siting away from the states but may 
see fit to do so in the other siting regimes.  Although each of these theories 
has merit in explaining why any one infrastructure regime has tipped, their 
limits lie in their inability to inform a comparative analysis.  Arguments in 
support of these explanations apply with similar force to the other siting 
regimes, rendering these explanations unsatisfactory.   
Instead, this Article proposes another explanation for the disparity: the 
ability of federal agencies to exert their federal influence through 
alternative outlets.  Where an agency is able to use its existing statutory 
authority to shape a decision that has been reserved to the state or local 
governments, it may reduce the pressure to formally alter the federalism 
balance.  This Article uses electricity siting to demonstrate how federal 
agencies are able to exert an element of federal control over the fuel source 
used to generate electricity through alternative legal outlets without 
resorting to a formal tip in the actual federalism balance.  By acting on the 
margins through existing statutory authorities, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the 
Department of Interior have each been able to exert a degree of influence 
over the siting of electricity generation that may be sufficient to counteract 
the justifications for a formal tip in the federalism balance.  Such exercise 
of existing statutory authority by relevant agencies may play a key role in 
explaining the disparity in the siting regimes, as well as provide insights 
into the broader federalism literature surrounding the circumstances that 
affect tips from state towards federal authority.   
Part II begins with an explanation into the traditional justifications for 
centralized federal control.  These justifications are: (1) transboundary 
issues across state lines that create externalities; (2) the need for uniformity 
or harmonization; (3) under-regulation that can result in a race to the 
bottom between states, threatening state public safety and welfare; (4) 
overregulation that can result from “Not in My Backyard” (“NIMBY”) 
scenarios threatening national public safety and welfare; and (5) the 
provision of public goods that require resource pooling. 
Part III chronicles how control over the siting of similar commonplace 
infrastructure—railroads, natural gas pipelines, telecommunications, and 
electricity transmission—all began with a commitment to state control and 
later tipped through congressional action to some form of enhanced federal 
control.  It highlights the federalism justifications for centralized authority 
that were placing pressure on the prior federalism design, as well as the 
limited actions of the respective federal agencies to address national 
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interests.   
Despite these tips, authority over the siting of electricity generation is 
resistant to this trend and remains under state and local control.  Part IV 
applies the traditional federalism justifications for centralized authority to 
the siting of electricity generation.  It demonstrates how the siting of 
electricity generation reflects many of the same federalism justifications 
for federal involvement as the other siting regimes, yet it yields different 
results. 
Since all of the siting regimes share some of the traditional centralized 
federalism justifications for federal involvement, Part V analyzes other 
possible factors that may be unique to the siting of generation that may 
temper federalism justifications for federal involvement in deciding the 
source of our electricity.  It looks to federalism virtues associated with 
decentralized state or local control, a longstanding tradition of state or local 
control over land use decisions, and public choice theories for guidance in 
explaining the disparity, ultimately finding each unsatisfying. 
Part VI sets forth an alternative explanation for the disparity: the 
availability of alternative outlets for expressing a growing federal interest.  
It highlights a distinguishing feature between the federal interest in siting 
electricity generation and the siting of other infrastructure.  Rather than a 
federal interest limited to ensuring the infrastructure is ultimately sited, the 
federal interest in the siting of electricity generation extends to the type of 
infrastructure being sited.  This allows for slightly more flexibility in 
avenues by which to affect the type of electricity generation being sited 
without running afoul of jurisdictional boundaries.  This section provides 
examples of the ways that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Interior may 
have each been able to exert a sufficient degree of influence over the type 
of resources used to generate electricity sited through their existing 
statutory authorities to alleviate the pressure to formally tip toward 
enhanced federal control.  
The analysis ends with Part VII, which identifies continuing pressures 
on the proper balance of power in siting regimes and urges continued focus 
on the role of administrative agencies in affecting the circumstances 
surrounding tipping points of federalism. 
II.  TRADITIONAL FEDERALISM JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CENTRALIZED 
CONTROL 
Traditional discussions about allocating authority between federal and 
subfederal (state and local) systems typically involved taking one of two 
polar positions along the federalism spectrum.  At one end of the spectrum 
lie those speaking in favor of a stronger national government and a more 
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restrictive state and local power, often referred to as centralization
16
 or 
federalization.
17
  At the other end of the spectrum lie those arguing for 
greater authority in the state or local government, often evoking terms like 
decentralization
18
 or devolution.
19
  Contemporary discussions seem to 
place much more emphasis on the center, grouping those regimes which 
argue for shared power between the federal and subfederal governments 
into a category often referred to as “cooperative federalism.”20  To assess 
the normative merits of each approach, scholars and judges have coalesced 
around a package of abstract virtues associated with state authority 
(decentralized)
21
 and federal authority (centralized), respectively.
22
  
But the level of power for any given regime is far from static.  Not 
only has there been an increasing volume of literature focusing on iterative 
or dynamic federalism,
23
 which envisions a fluid back and forth between 
different levels of government, but there are also formal congressional tips 
from one level of power to another.  What is it that facilitates these tips?  
And more importantly for purposes of this analysis, what is it that 
facilitates congressional tips from state and local to more enhanced federal 
control?  One answer may lie in changes to the presence and strength of the 
federalism justifications associated with a given activity. 
                                                                                                                          
16 See Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in Health Care 
Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 266, 266 (2011). 
17 William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 720 
(1995); see also Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in 
Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 847 (2009) (explaining how the federal 
government’s previous intervention in healthcare spending has necessitated federalization of medical 
malpractice).  
18 See Mark Moller, The Rule of Law Problem: Unconstitutional Class Actions and Options for 
Reform, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 855, 883, 900 (2005) (discussing the merits of decentralization in 
the context of multidistrict litigation as one possible way to better reform class action lawsuits, noting 
that decentralization can reduce the cost of error by government decision makers and encourage 
competition between different “power centers of government”). 
19 See Paul E. Peterson, Devolution’s Price, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 114 (1996). 
20 “Decentralization is no longer an alternative to centralization.  Both are needed.  The 
complementary roles of national and subnational actors should be determined by analyzing the most 
effective ways and means of achieving a desired objective.”  Chanchal Kumar Sharma, Emerging 
Dimensions of Decentralization Debate in the Age of Glocalization, 1/2009 INDIAN J. FED. STUD. 47, 
48–49 (2009); see also Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A 
Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1242, 1244 (1995) (arguing “that the national interest in clean water and related wetlands 
functions merits a strong federal presence,” while also acknowledging the benefits of “an active state 
partnership”); Philip J. Weiser, Cooperative Federalism and Its Challenges, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. 
REV. 727, 728 (2003). 
21 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
22 See discussion infra at Part II. 
23 See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 
(2009) (discussing iterative federalism in the context of environmental policymaking); Kirsten H. 
Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 
175–77 (2006) (discussing dynamic federalism in the context of environmental law). 
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Federalism scholars like Professor Robert Glicksman have identified 
five traditional federalism justifications for a move towards centralized 
control, focused primarily on collective action problems: (1) transboundary 
issues across state lines that create externalities; (2) the need for uniformity 
or harmonization; (3) under-regulation that can result in a race to the 
bottom between states, threatening state public safety and welfare; (4) 
overregulation that can result from NIMBY scenarios, threatening national 
public safety and welfare; and (5) the provision of public goods that 
require resource pooling.
24
  Importantly, not all five federalism virtues 
need to be realized to justify a tip towards federal control.  In fact, the 
presence of just one strong federalism virtue can be enough.
25
  This section 
explains each of these justifications in more detail below. 
A.  Transboundary Issues 
The first justification for federal involvement is its ability to better deal 
with externalities associated with transboundary issues.  Policies adopted 
to maximize a state’s own welfare can impose external costs on 
neighboring states, decreasing national efficiency.
26
  State and local 
governments sometimes seek to shift negative regulatory byproducts or 
stigmas onto outsiders.
27
  Exporting negative regulatory byproducts, such 
as pollution, is often a problem in environmental regulation.
28
  For 
example, “a state may regulate a factory in a manner that protects its 
citizens, but causes pollution to be thrown off to people in bordering 
states.”29  Additionally, “political economists generally agree that it is 
appropriate for the national government to restrict regulation by the states 
that may impose great negative externalities on sister states.”30  
                                                                                                                          
24 Robert Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption 
by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 
594–600 (2008).   
25 See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 405–10 (1997) (providing a 
non-comprehensive list of common reasons for centralized national control—uniformity, race to the 
bottom, public goods, and externalities—and noting that there may be other reasons to exercise national 
authority); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in Mandating State 
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211–20 (1977) (identifying 
several justifications for the movement toward centralized federal environmental regulation).  
26 Glicksman & Levy, supra note 24, at 594. 
27 David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption 
Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1137 (1999). 
28 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 601 
n.101 (1996) (“[A]ir pollution is a problem that rarely falls within ready-made political boundaries.  In 
any metropolitan area both the social costs incurred in failing to control it and the benefits to be derived 
from regulation within a single political subdivision inevitably spill over into other jurisdictions . . . . 
The necessity for . . . uniformity is rather generally agreed upon.” (quoting Air Pollution, 1967 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th 
Cong. 993 (1967) (testimony of Lewis C. Green of the Missouri Air Conservation Commission))). 
29 Friedman, supra note 25, at 407. 
30 Id. 
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Centralization can maximize efficiency by internalizing this spillover 
effect “through the incentives implicit within a national legislature.”31  And 
centralization need not tip all the way to federal control.  For instance, 
states have attempted to address transboundary issues, such as management 
of the Great Lakes, by centralizing to a level of regional interstate 
compacts as opposed to federal governance.
32
   
B.  Uniformity or Harmonization 
The second justification for centralized control is the ability to provide 
uniformity through single federal standards.  Industry may call for federal 
regulation where it enables them to avoid disparate regulatory burdens 
across fifty states.
33
  Uniform federal laws result in greater efficiency by 
reducing transaction costs between states.
34
  Federal legislation may be 
warranted when businesses operating between states are encumbered by a 
lack of uniformity among states.
35
  National policies also prevent a 
“piecemeal judicial approach” which undermines predictability and 
inhibits free trade.
36
  Professor Barry Friedman touts free trade as “likely to 
play more of a role in the future in centralizing regulatory authority.”37  
Because trade thrives on uniformity, local legislation often “runs the risk of 
imposing novel requirements that inhibit the easy movement of goods and 
                                                                                                                          
31 Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: 
Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
1203, 1229 (1997).  Professors Issacharoff and Sharkey explored the implications of situations when 
“claims of state sovereignty do pose risks to the rest of the country, when experiments of democracy 
within one state’s borders have spillover effects that adversely affect citizens of other states,” noting 
that this may deprive the citizens of other states “of the political means of compelling democratic 
accountability on economic actors shielded by other states’ claims of sovereignty.”  Samuel Issacharoff 
& Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1355 (2006). 
32 See Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the 
Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 406 (2006) (describing cooperative horizontal 
federalism as a way to utilize common minimum standards that are imposed on states by an interstate 
compact as opposed to the federal government). 
33 Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on State 
Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 85 (2007) (discussing how federal 
preemption of automobile emissions standards resulted from lobbying by U.S. automakers who feared 
the potential for different states to adopt different emissions standards). 
34 Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism: Whatever Happened to Devolution?, 14 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 429, 453 (1996). 
35 Id. at 452.  The Reagan Administration, for example, concluded that product liability law 
required federal standardization. “Implicit in this decision was a determination that conflicting state 
product liability laws have created such significant burdens on interstate commerce that preemptive 
federal legislation was necessary to provide consistent nationwide treatment of product liability 
disputes.”  C. Boyden Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 93, 96 (1983) (referencing 
the Reagan administration’s support for national legislation to supplant state laws). 
36 Arthur H. Harding & Paul W. Jamieson, Dismantling the Final Regulatory Entry Barriers: A 
Call for the FCC to Assert Its Preemptive Authority, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 533, 554 (1999). 
37 Friedman, supra note 25, at 375. 
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people.”38  It is “almost always easier and less costly to comply with one 
standard than to attempt to comply with multiple standards that vary 
depending on the jurisdiction.”39  Therefore, businesses and free-market 
advocates prefer a centralized system because a uniform national policy 
radically simplifies operations.
40
   
C.  Race to the Bottom 
The third justification for centralized control is the ability to protect the 
citizenry by preventing a race to the bottom.  The race to the bottom theory 
suggests that decentralized competition may “lead a state to eschew 
policies that it truly desires for fear that they will influence a mobile 
citizenry and commercial-industrial base to react in ways that undermine 
local welfare.”41  States may have little incentive to impose more stringent 
regulations than other states for fear that businesses will find the more 
relaxed regulatory environment more favorable and shift their contribution 
to the tax base and local economy to the less stringent state.
42
  It is 
particularly this type of under-regulation where enhanced federal control 
                                                                                                                          
38 Id. at 376. 
39 Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 732 (2008). 
40 Id. 
41 Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State 
Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1012 (1995).  But see Kirsten H. Engel, 
State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 
271, 278 (1997) (arguing that interstate competition in real world situations is in fact detrimental to 
social welfare despite theoretical models showing it to be beneficial); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to 
the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. 
U. L. REV. 913, 920 (1982) (explaining that state control over corporate law does not create a “race-to-
the-bottom,” but rather a “climb to the top”); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: 
Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1210, 1253 (1992) (challenging the race-to-the-bottom rationale for centralized environmental 
legislation and arguing that state competition is presumptively beneficial). 
42 One contemporary example of the race to the bottom is the regulation of the fracking of shale 
formations to release natural gas.  When fracking comes to town, mineral rights owners become 
millionaires, the unemployment rate drops, businesses prosper from the influx of developers, and the 
state derives tax dollars.  See, e.g., Brian A. Shactman, Unemployed? Go to North Dakota, MSN 
MONEY, Oct. 5, 2011, available at http://money.msn.com/investing/unemployed-go-to-north-dakota-
cnbc.aspx (attributing an influx of billions of dollars to the state economy, a jobless rate that is one-
third that of the national rate, and a high demand for new housing developments to the fracking boom in 
North Dakota).  These benefits are difficult to ignore, providing the state with a strong financial interest 
in luring the developers within their borders, even if it involves doing so with environmental regulation 
that is less restrictive than its shale-sharing neighbors.  In 2010, the governor of New York imposed a 
moratorium on fracking until the state could complete an environmental review.  See Matt Willie, 
Comment, Hydraulic Fracturing and "Spotty" Regulation: Why the Federal Government Should Let 
States Control Unconventional Onshore Drilling, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1743, 1763 (2011) (discussing the 
controls New York has placed on fracking).  Pennsylvania, in stark comparison to New York’s strict 
regulatory regime, has taken a more laissez-faire approach to drilling and permitted 2,349 wells to be 
drilled in the Marcellus Shale between 2008 and 2010, “with 1,386 of those wells drilled in 2010 
alone.”  Beren Argetsinger, Comment, The Marcellus Shale: Bridge to a Clean Energy Future or 
Bridge to Nowhere? Environmental, Energy and Climate Policy Considerations for Shale Gas 
Development in New York State, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 326 (2011). 
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may be beneficial to the welfare of the citizens.  A noble justification for 
centralization is to “guarantee a minimum level of environmental 
protection to citizens regardless of their place of residence . . . [that] helps 
guarantee that citizens can travel freely without encountering unreasonable 
risks to their health or welfare from environmental conditions.”43  In 
response, federal control can alleviate such a race to the bottom by leveling 
the playing field between the states.
44
   
D.  NIMBY 
A fourth justification for centralized control is the ability to address 
problems of overregulation.  This justification typically arises in the 
context of the NIMBY phenomenon.  Furthermore, “[t]he NIMBY 
phenomenon arises when there is some undesirable but necessary activity 
or facility that must be located somewhere. . . . In such cases, states may 
impose regulatory burdens intended to drive the activity into other 
states.”45  In these circumstances, calls for federal action may arise to 
prevent the states from blocking projects that can be beneficial to the 
nation as a whole.  The most common NIMBY example is the siting of a 
nuclear waste storage facility, an activity that few, if any states want to 
engage in, and yet is important for the benefit of the nation.
46
  In the 
context of high-level nuclear waste, for instance, the federal government 
imposed the storage of high-level nuclear waste on the state of Nevada 
despite state efforts to block the activity.
47
 
E.  Public Goods 
The last traditional justification for centralized authority is the ability 
                                                                                                                          
43 Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1141, 1171–72 (1995). 
44 Id. at 1151 (noting that match companies called for federal regulation of white phosphorus 
where states were reluctant to adopt measures that would drive employers out of state).     
45 Glicksman & Levy, supra note 24, at 600.  “This scenario is essentially the flipside of a 
negative externality problem because the source of a NIMBY problem is a positive externality—the 
state that is the location of the activity bears all or most of the environmental burdens, but the economic 
benefits are spread to other states.”  Id. 
46 One hundred and four nuclear reactors are currently operating in our country, storing over 
60,000 tons of radioactive spent fuel across our country.  Matthew McKinzie, Sixty Thousand Tons of 
Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Stored at U.S. Reactors for 60 Years?, SWITCHBOARD NATURAL RES. 
DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (Feb. 23, 2011), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/mmckinzie/sixty_thous
and_tons_of_commerc.html. 
47 See Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, PUB. L. NO. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330, 
227–28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10172 (1988)) (designating Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as 
the sole repository site to be characterized).  The storage facility was abandoned for other reasons, but 
only after twelve billion dollars had been spent on characterizing and initial development of the site. 
Hannah Northey, GAO: Death of Yucca Mountain Caused by Political Maneuvering, N.Y. TIMES, May 
10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/10/10greenwire-gao-death-of-yucca-mountain-
caused-by-politica-36298.html?pagewanted=all. 
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of the federal government to provide public goods that states may be 
lacking incentives to provide.
48
  These are often characterized by a lack of 
sufficient resources by any individual state, but that can be sufficient 
through the pooling of resources.  For example, a danger to our country 
may present the need for a strong national defense that each individual 
state could not provide.  Illnesses that affect all of our citizens may present 
a need for a scientific research broadly applicable to all of our citizens that 
each individual state may not have the resources to provide.  In such 
technical fields, states “lack sufficient incentives to provide public goods, 
such as scientific or economic research, that would improve their decision-
making capability.”49  If a state invests in a technical regulatory area, the 
results “will be tailored to their unique situation and not necessarily 
applicable in other areas of the country.”50  And public goods such as 
sewer systems, clean water, and clean air generate social benefits (positive 
externalities) that are not fully captured in their private costs, which could 
result in undersupply without the intervention of the federal government.
51
 
Poor states often lack the federal government’s “technical competence” to 
regulate effectively.
52
  While the national government also has budget 
constraints, it has more fiscal tools to fund regulation to address egalitarian 
concerns.
53
 
In sum, the presence of one or more of the five traditional federalism 
justifications for increased centralized control can support a corresponding 
tip.  The next section will evaluate the relevance of these five justifications 
to the tips that occurred in the infrastructure siting regimes. 
 
III.  TIPPING POINTS OF SITING REGIMES 
Siting of infrastructure in our country is rife with federalism 
controversies.  The most high-profile federalism siting controversies 
involve Congress’s attempts to alter the balance of power between the 
states and the federal government with regard to a single, high-impact 
siting.  Two examples are the siting of a permanent repository for  
                                                                                                                          
48 Friedman, supra note 25, at 406–07. 
49 Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for 
Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 424 (2008). 
50 Id. at 424–25. 
51 Friedman, supra note 25, at 406 (“Public goods are those that would not be provided if it were 
not for the existence of some central authority to fund them.”).  
52 Sovacool, supra note 49, at 426.  One argument is that “the federal government is well-
equipped to provide capital-intensive services like the construction of deep salt-lined storage facilities 
for high-level nuclear waste, but is likely to be inept at conducting labor-intensive services like the 
management of public hearings to minimize public opposition to waste sites.” Roderick M. Hills, Jr., 
The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual 
Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 869–70 (1998).  
53 Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1549–50 (1994). 
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high-level nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada
54
 and the siting of a 
1,700 mile Keystone XL oil pipeline that would run from Canada, through 
six states in the heartland of the nation, down to Texas.
55
  
But in many ways, the more important siting decisions are those that 
occur on a regular basis.  These decisions include the siting of railroad 
tracks and facilities, telecommunications towers and fiber optic cables, 
natural gas pipelines, electricity transmission lines, and the generators that 
power our electric grid.  As opposed to one-time, big ticket sitings that 
elicit great controversy and public scrutiny, these repetitive siting decisions 
occur frequently, often under the media’s radar, and often elicit 
controversy only from those living closest to the siting.  Although they 
reflect a small sample size in the broad world of tips, the focus on siting 
authority can provide some useful insights into factors affecting tipping 
points for other areas.  This analysis yields a number of general principles 
concerning the impact of the regulated community, the federal 
government, the states, and the affected citizenry on the political decision 
to tip from state to federal control. 
Not surprisingly, all of the siting regimes discussed in this analysis 
were initially governed by state or local authority.  In their most general 
sense, siting decisions are characterized by two elements:  A governmental 
entity first decides (1) whether there is a “need” for the infrastructure to be 
sited,
56
 and then decides (2) where the infrastructure should be sited.  
                                                                                                                          
54 After years of trying to secure a permanent repository for the nation’s high-level nuclear waste, 
the federal government eventually decided to force over 60,000 tons of the highly radioactive substance 
onto the state of Nevada against its strong objections.  See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 10132, 10172 (2006) (charging DOE with the responsibility to find a site and subsequently 
narrowing the choices to Yucca Mountain, Nevada in 1987); see also Public Health and Environmental 
Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, NV, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,081 (June 13, 2001) 
(discussing why Yucca Mountain was chosen).  After two decades, “the Secretary of Energy has 
decided that a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain is not a workable option for long-term 
disposition of these materials.”  U.S. Dep’t of Energy’s Motion to Withdraw 1, In  re U.S. Dep’t of 
Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), No. 63-001 (N.R.C. Mar. 3, 2010), available at 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/DOE_Motion_to_Withdraw.pdf. 
55 Nebraska opposes the siting of this 1,700 mile pipeline through the nation’s heartland, a siting 
decision that rests with the State Department due to its transnational effects across Canada and the U.S.  
In January 2012, President Obama refused to approve the pipeline under a congressionally-imposed 
accelerated timeframe, but would consider alternative routes that do not “risk[] the health and safety of 
the American people and the environment.”  Statement by the President on the Keystone XL Pipeline, 
Jan. 18, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/18/statement-
president-keystone-xl-pipeline.  To counter this state interest, Congress has declared that “[t]he 
development and delivery of oil and gas from Canada to the United States is in the national interest of 
the United States in order to secure oil supplies to fill needs that are projected to otherwise be filled by 
increases in other foreign supplies.”  North American-Made Energy Security Act, H.R. 1938, 112th 
Cong. § 2(4) (2011). 
56 Transmission lines and natural gas pipelines require a certificate of need; telecommunications 
infrastructure requires a certificate of necessity, and railroads require a certificate of convenience and 
necessity.  See, e.g., infra notes 68 and 133. 
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Implicit in these analyses is often a decision about the type of 
infrastructure to be constructed and the resources that will be used.  In all 
cases, a state or local entity initially handled these decisions.  In some 
situations, Congress enacted legislation to secure the role of the states over 
these local issues.
57
  In other cases, the decentralized authority was a 
natural default for the manner in which this infrastructure developed.  
Perhaps more surprising is the fact that all of these infrastructure siting 
regimes, except for the siting of electricity generation, eventually tipped 
towards some form of enhanced federal control.
58
   
This section demonstrates the historic control of the states, the 
presence of one or more of the traditional federalism justifications for 
centralized authority in each of the regimes, and the congressional action 
that tipped the balance of power from state towards enhanced federal 
control over the siting of four types of commonplace infrastructure: (1) 
railroads; (2) natural gas; (3) telecommunications; and (4) electricity 
transmission. 
A.  Railroad Tip 
The first siting regime to tip was the railroads.  From the dawn of the 
railroad, the decision to lay down tracks or other railroad infrastructure fell 
to a local level.
59
  Railroad owners had largely free rein as to the creation 
and location of railroad infrastructure, limited only by state regulation, 
which had been described as “crude.”60  Since at least 1832, state railroad 
commissions began to take a more active role in the siting decisions.
61
  For 
nearly half a century, railroads faced little competition from other 
transportation options, resulting in the “golden age” of railroads where the 
rail network grew from 35,000 miles of tracks to a peak of 254,000 miles 
                                                                                                                          
57 As described supra, Congress codified state control over the siting of generation, transmission, 
and distribution infrastructure in the FPA. 
58 For purposes of this Article, enhanced federal control includes any shift in the power balance 
toward a more centralized level of authority, including complete preemption, partial preemption, or 
some form of backstop authority. 
59 Since its first use in the United States in 1827, railroads have been under state control.  See 
Railroad Industry Overview Series- History of the Railroad Industry, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Railroad-Industry-Overview-Series---History-of-the-Railroad-Industry--
-October-2007 (last updated Sept. 27, 2012). 
60 National Railroad Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1885, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9901E1DF1F39E533A25750C0A9649D94649FD
7CF. 
61 Mark T. Kanazawa & Roger G. Noll, The Origins of State Railroad Regulation: The Illinois 
Constitution of 1870, in THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL 
ECOMONY 13, 14 (Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994) (“[F]or three decades before the 
passage of the Interstate Commerce Act, many states regulated tariffs and routes for both passengers 
and freight.”).  
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in 1916, all under state control.
62
 
James Ely, in chronicling the rise of federal control over the rail 
industry, has noted that “eminent authorities had long urged federal control 
of the industry.”63  But “[i]t was easier, however, to clamor for federal 
controls than to decide upon the appropriate type of legislation.”64  “[F]ew 
doubted that rail operations were within the power of Congress,”65 and 
Congress enacted several statutes that strengthened the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (“ICC”) and greatly enlarged national control of 
railroads.
66
 
For our purposes, the relevant point in the march towards 
federalization was the Transportation Act of 1920 (“Transportation Act”).67  
The Transportation Act amended the Interstate Commerce Act, providing 
the ICC with exclusive siting authority over new rail lines or facilities.  It 
provided that no extensions or new lines could be built, nor could any 
portion of a line be abandoned, without a certificate of convenience and 
necessity from the ICC.
68
  The Supreme Court affirmed this exclusive 
authority of the federal government to determine whether railroad 
infrastructure was necessary and in the public interest, rejecting attempts 
by a state railroad commission to do so.
69
  Notably, this federal control 
established a presumption that rail construction projects are in the public 
interest unless shown otherwise.
70
  Unlike in other siting regimes discussed 
                                                                                                                          
62 Railroad Industry Overview Series, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Railroad-Industry-
Overview-SeriesHistory-of-the-Railroad-IndustryOctober-2007 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
63 James W. Ely, Jr., “The Railroad System Has Burst Through State Limits”: Railroads and 
Interstate Commerce, 1830–1920, 55 ARK. L. REV. 933, 966 (2003). 
64 Id. at 966. 
65 Id. 
66 See id. at 967 (stating that federal control began in 1862 with the Interstate Commerce Act that 
created the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Safety Appliance Act of 1893, but continued in 
quick succession with the Elkins Act of 1903, the Hepburn Act of 1906, and the Mann-Elkins Act of 
1910). 
67 Melvin F. Fincke, Is Competition Between Carriers To Be Considered by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission When Granting Certificates of Convenience and Necessity?, 25 TEX. L. REV. 
406, 406 (1947) (citing Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456 (1920) (codified 
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.)). 
68 ROGERS MACVEAGH, THE TRANSPORTATION ACT, 1920: ITS SOURCES, HISTORY, AND TEXT, 
TOGETHER WITH ITS AMENDMENTS TO THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT, EXPLAINED, ANALYZED, 
AND COMPARED 195 (1923).  Consistent with contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Congress 
did not give the ICC authority over rail lines located wholly within one state.  Id. at 197, 219.  The 
Supreme Court has declared that the ICC can regulate intrastate commerce only as an incident to the 
control of interstate commerce.  Ely, supra note 63, at 976 (noting that “calls for federal control of the 
rail industry steadily mounted after the Civil War”).  
69 R.R. Comm’n of Cal. v. S. Pac. Co., 264 U.S. 331, 347 (1924). 
70 Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 552 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding 
that 49 U.S.C. § 10901(c) gives rise to statutory presumption that rail construction is to be approved). 
 2012] THE TIPPING POINT OF FEDERALISM  235 
below, even the location of the lines is subject to federal approval.
71
  This 
federal power to issue a certificate of convenience and necessity for 
railroad infrastructure continues today through the ICC’s successor, the 
Surface Transportation Board (“STB”).72   
Enhanced federal control over rail lines was prompted by a number of 
factors. First, in the early 1900s, the federal government faced the then-
unique threat of a world war.  Only three weeks before Congress declared 
war on Germany, the Supreme Court upheld congressional legislation that 
foisted an eight-hour work day upon the rail industry, reasoning that an 
“emergency may afford a reason for the exercise of living power already 
enjoyed” and paved the way for the emergency powers doctrine.73  In 
1917, the federal government seized control of the railroads for the 
duration of the war.
74
  Following the end of World War I, President Wilson 
returned control to private actors, but further strengthened federal control 
of the railroads by vetoing a bill that would have stripped the Railroad 
Administration of its power over rates and schedules and returned the 
ICC’s pre-war rate-making authority, holding that the Railroad 
Administration’s “authority . . . was necessary to enable it promptly to 
meet operating emergencies.”75  Passed in 1920, the Transportation Act 
preserves the President’s right to assert federal control over railroads and 
other transportation systems in times of war.
76
   
Second, there was the desire to minimize inefficiencies associated with 
piecemeal planning.  In the aftermath of mass production during wartime, 
the nation was left with excess supply and unnecessary and parallel lines.
77
  
A speech by Senator Cummins of Iowa prior to the passage of the 
Transportation Act of 1920 indicated that the United States railroad system 
was suffering as a result of the “unguided, uncontrolled right of owners to 
build railroads wherever they may see fit.”78  Railroad companies 
                                                                                                                          
71 49 C.F.R. § 1150.4 (2011).  The railroad’s plan is also subject to environmental review and 
must meet federal and state environmental regulations.  49 C.F.R. § 1150.7  In some situations, this 
may indirectly give states a role in determining where a line is located.   
72 49 U.S.C. § 10901 (2006) (discussing how similar to the ICC, the STB must issue a certificate 
authorizing construction and operation of railroad lines unless it finds that the activities are inconsistent 
with public convenience and necessity). 
73 Michal R. Belknap, The New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62 TEX. L. REV. 67, 
79–81 (1983). 
74 Railroad Industry Overview Series: History of the Railroad Industry, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/article/0,,id=175287,00.html (last updated Aug. 25, 2011). 
75 President Vetoes Pre-war Rate Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1919, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9806E2DB153BEE32A2575AC1A9679D946896
D6CF. 
76 Toledo, P. & W. R.R. v. Stover, 60 F. Supp 587 (S.D. Ill. 1945) (citing Ch. 91, § 402, 41 Stat. 
at 457–58 (1920)). 
77 MACVEAGH, supra note 68, at 219. 
78 Id. at 221. 
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abandoned overbuilt lines,
79
 and the courts became overcrowded with 
cases regarding the legal obligations associated with those abandoned 
railroad lands.  This untenable situation demonstrated a need for federal 
control over the abandonment of railroad lines.
80
  And as the Supreme 
Court has subsequently noted in other contexts, “the Federal Government 
has determined that a uniform regulatory scheme is necessary to the 
operation of the national rail system.”81 
A third catalyst for the tip was the infringement on fundamental rights 
that was occurring on some railroads under state control.  Railroads were 
discriminating against African-Americans, and Senator Cullom proposed a 
bill in 1884 that would provide federal regulation to address this behavior.   
Senator Cullom’s bill prohibited “any company engaged in transportation 
from one State to another from making unreasonable charges, or charging 
more to one person than to another for the same service, or refusing equal 
facilities to all.”82  As a New York Times description of the bill notes, “The 
public judgment is very potent for the correction of evils provided it is 
properly enlightened.”83  The bill also provided the proposed National 
Railroad Commission with federal power to investigate allegations of 
discrimination, and even more significantly, to report any information 
collected on the railroad companies to the Secretary of the Interior on an 
annual basis.
84
  Three years later, just two months after the creation of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, it found railroad companies in violation 
of the Interstate Commerce Act “by failing to provide African-American 
passengers with accommodations equal to those of whites,” consequently 
creating “the doctrine of separate but equal almost a decade before Plessy 
v. Ferguson was decided.”85  Thus, the federal government justified its 
involvement in the railway system through various facets of 
discrimination.  As Cass Sunstein has noted, “When a national moral 
commitment is involved, the case for uniformity is much stronger.”86   
In sum, authority over railroad infrastructure tipped from state control 
towards increased federal control in light of national security concerns, as a 
                                                                                                                          
79 Danaya C. Wright, The Shifting Sands of Property Rights, Federal Railroad Grants, and 
Economic History: Hash v. United States and the Threat to Rail-Trail Conversions, 38 ENVTL. L. 711, 
721 (2008). 
80 See id. (showing that the current system was insufficient to address the abandonment of railroad 
lines).  
81 United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 688 (1982). 
82 A National Railroad Commission, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 1884, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9F01E0DB173FE533A25756C2A9629C94659FD
7CF. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Reuel E. Schiller, Comment, The Administrative State, Front and Center: Studying Law and 
Administration in Postwar America, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 415, 420–21 (2008). 
86 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 
226 (1990). 
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response to piecemeal planning and economic waste, and to provide 
transparency to invidious racial discrimination occurring on the railroads. 
B.  Natural Gas Tip  
A second example of Congress altering a federalism framework from a 
decentralized, state-centered authority to complete preemption by the 
federal government is in the siting of natural gas pipelines.
87
  Siting of 
pipelines began locally.  Although one of the first natural gas pipelines ran 
only 5.5 miles in 1859, by 1891, pipelines had grown to 120 miles.
88
  
Initial distribution networks were largely within one municipality and fell 
under the regulatory powers of local governments.
89
  But as the networks 
began to cross over city lines, state governments intervened.
90
  And as they 
crossed over state lines, the federal government intervened.
91
   
In 1938, Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) that provided 
the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”) with jurisdiction over the pricing 
of natural gas in interstate commerce, as well as with exclusive siting 
authority over pipelines that would deliver “natural gas into a market 
already served by another pipeline.”92  Before that time, there is no 
evidence of the FPC playing any meaningful role in the siting of natural 
gas pipelines, as regulation occurred through municipalities and state 
public utility commissions.
93
  This meant that in order to build an interstate 
pipeline, companies must first receive the approval of the FPC.
94
  As a 
                                                                                                                          
87 Notably, control over the siting of onshore liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) terminals (which 
provide the point of entry and departure for liquefied natural gas that has been compressed and loaded 
into tankers) also came under exclusive federal control, but is not included in this analysis.  LNG 
development began after the NGA was enacted, so authority over siting was never quite clear.  FERC 
approved construction applications on a case-by-case basis, but jurisdictional uncertainties arose 
concerning LNG that was to be used solely for intrastate distribution, with California challenging 
FERC’s authority over the siting of such terminals.  Fearing delays for LNG projects nationwide, 
FERC asked Congress to intervene and grant exclusive federal authority.  Jacob Dweck, David 
Wochner & Michael Brooks, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Litigation After the Energy Policy Act of 
2005: State Powers in LNG Terminal Siting, 27 ENERGY L.J. 473, 480 (2006).  In 2005, Congress 
provided FERC with express authority over applications to site, construct, expand, or operate onshore 
LNG terminals.  Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2006).  Since authority for the siting of these 
projects was never clearly with the states, this action is not characterized as a tip for purposes of this 
analysis, but an action to clarify federal jurisdiction.   
88 History, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.org/overview/history.asp (last visited May 
28, 2012) (“One of the first lengthy pipelines was constructed in 1891.  This pipeline was 120 miles 
long, and carried natural gas from wells in central Indiana to the city of Chicago.”). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id.; see also Carl I. Wheat, Administration by the Federal Power Commission of the Certificate 
Provisions of the Natural Gas Act, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 194, 196 (1945–1946) (explaining the 
subsequent clarification of “a market in which natural gas is already being served”). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
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result, the NGA provides the federal government with exclusive control 
over siting interstate pipelines.
95
  This federal power continues today 
through the FPC’s successor, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”). 
The initial tip towards federal control over the natural gas pipelines 
began not with control over the physical infrastructure, but with control 
over the rates charged for natural gas, a move prompted by the concerns 
over monopoly power.
96
  This federal control over rates eventually spilled 
over into control over the infrastructure with Congress’s passage of the 
NGA.
97
  There, the tip from state to federal control over siting can be 
largely attributed to the desire to avoid piecemeal and inefficient outcomes.  
As technology improved, natural gas could be transported over longer 
distances, and soon states were regulating transport over state lines.  This 
development, however, subjected natural gas firms to multiple regulations 
from multiple states, which, at times, were in conflict with each other.
98
  
Federal control, combined with technological advances, led to a “post-war 
pipeline construction boom lasted well into the ‘60s, and allowed for the 
construction of thousands of miles of pipeline in America.”99 
C.  Telecommunications Tip 
A third example of Congress altering the balance of power involves 
telecommunications infrastructure: the “cables, antennas, poles, [and] 
towers,” and in the case of wireless/broadband facilities, fiber optic 
cables.
100
   The tip in the telecommunications industry focuses on the siting 
of wireless communications towers.  As with railroad infrastructure, the 
power to site telecommunications infrastructure initially rested with the 
states.  After the invention of the telephone by Alexander Graham Bell, 
                                                                                                                          
95 Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2012).  Although the vast majority of natural gas 
pipelines are interstate, more than ninety intrastate natural gas pipelines operate in the lower-forty-eight 
states, primarily in Texas.   These are pipelines that operate totally within one state, do not physically 
interconnect, and are not subject to FERC jurisdiction.  About Natural Gas Pipelines, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/intrastate.
html (last visited May 28, 2012). 
96 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T 53, 53 (1995).  
97 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z. 
98 Id. 
99 History, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.org/overview/history.asp (last visited May 
28, 2012) (noting welding techniques, pipe rolling, and metallurgical advances allowed for the 
construction of reliable pipelines). 
100 In the Matter of Acceleration of Broadband Deployment: Expanding the Reach and Reducing 
the Cost of Broadband Deployment by Improving Policies Regarding Public Rights of Way and 
Wireless Facilities Siting, 26 F.C.C.R. 5384, 5385 (2011). 
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states began regulating telephone service in the early 1900s.
101
  In 1934, 
Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934, which established a 
dual regulatory model for radio and wire communications.
102
  It created the 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), which was given authority 
over all interstate communications,
103
 and left intrastate communications in 
the hands of the states to regulate through their PUCs.
104
  Frequently 
described by scholars as a “natural monopoly,”105 state governments and 
even the federal government embraced the idea of a telecommunications 
industry dominated by the Bell system and decried competition as 
redundant.
106
   
Control over telecommunications tipped in 1996 when Congress 
passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“Telecommunications 
Act”).107  This statute both deregulated the telecommunications industry 
and tipped the balance of power over the siting of wireless 
telecommunications infrastructure from complete state control towards 
federal control. Notably, “[b]efore adopting the statute in conference, 
Congress considered a bill that would have assigned the FCC broad 
rulemaking power over the State and local siting process.”108   
Unlike some of the other siting regimes, which involved complete 
                                                                                                                          
101 Michigan, for example, began regulating in 1913.  TELECOMMC’NS ASS’N OF MICH., 
MICHIGAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT HANDBOOK 2 (2003), available at 
www.telecommich.org/Documents/mta_handbook.pdf.  
102 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
103 Id. 
104 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2012); see also Duane McLaughlin, Note, FCC Jurisdiction over Local 
Telephone Under the 1996 Act: Fenced Off?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2210, 2213 (1997) (“[T]he 1934 
Act . . . give[s] the FCC authority over all interstate communications but reserve[s] authority over 
intrastate communications to the states.”). 
105 See, e.g., John T. Soma et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Deregulated 
Telecommunications Industry, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 565, 603 (1998) (“AT&T was a natural 
monopoly protected from rivalry by public restrictions on entry.”); Robert B. Friedrich, Note, 
Regulatory and Antitrust Implications of Emerging Competition in Local Access Telecommunications: 
How Congress and the FCC Can Encourage Competition and Technological Progress in 
Telecommunications, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 646, 659 (1995) (describing local networks as “textbook 
examples of natural monopolies”). 
106 Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548 (1969); 
see also MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1133 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(explaining that Bell Systems was regarded as a natural monopoly because “it would not be 
economically feasible for MCI [a would-be competitor] to duplicate Bell’s local distribution facilities 
(involving millions of miles of cable and line to individual homes and business), and regulatory 
authorization could not be obtained for such an uneconomical duplication”). 
107 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006). 
108 Matthew K. Schettenhelm, Accelerated Wireless Build-Out: Responding to DAS and “Shot 
Clock,” 2 (Apr. 2011), http://www.millervaneaton.com/WirelessBuildout.pdf (footnote omitted); see 
Gregory Tan, Note, Wading Through the Rhetoric of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Uncertainty 
of Local Zoning Authority Over Wireless Telecommunications Tower Siting, 22 VT. L. REV. 461, 462–
63 (1997) (explaining that the Telecommunications industry would have preferred to bypass local 
zoning authorities and that it pushed the federal government to preempt local siting authority with the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996). 
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federal preemption, authority over the siting of wireless communications 
and electricity transmission lines tipped towards federal control but 
stopped short of exclusive federal authority.  Congress only partially 
preempted state siting authority over wireless telecommunications 
infrastructure, providing the federal government with control over the 
licensing of wireless infrastructure
109
 and leaving control over the location 
specifics largely to the states.
110
  But to ensure that state decisions would 
not hinder development of wireless telecommunications infrastructure,
111
 
Congress imposed three significant limitations on state regulation: (1) state 
regulation “shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of 
functionally equivalent services”;112 (2) “state regulation shall not prohibit 
or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of wireless services”;113 and 
(3) the local government cannot regulate on the basis of the environmental 
effects of radio frequency emissions if those facilities comply with relevant 
FCC regulations.
114
  Despite these federal restrictions imposed on state 
agencies, states have been successful in exerting their authority over siting 
decisions, even to the point of denying siting approval for wireless towers 
based on aesthetics.
115
     
The tip from state control to the partial federal preemption over 
wireless telecommunications infrastructure is attributed to a number of 
factors.  First, rising demand led to a national interest in growing the 
wireless communications industry.  There was an explosion in new 
communication technologies, including wireless telephone use.
116
  When 
                                                                                                                          
109 FCC: WIRELESS COMMC’N BUREAU, FACT SHEET #2: NATIONAL WIRELESS FACILITIES SITING 
POLICIES 4 (1996), available at http://wireless.fcc.gov/siting/preconstruction.html. 
110 The FCC encourages licensed providers to conduct research before applying for tower siting so 
that they may “target . . . site locations that are compatible with the proposed use, such as industrial 
zones, utility rights of way and pre-existing structures.”  Id. at 7. 
111 Steven J. Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY 
Problem, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 466 (2005).  In a somewhat ironic move, Congress entitled the 
relevant provision that partially preempted state siting authorities as “Preservation of Local Zoning 
Authority.”  47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2006). 
112 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I) (2006). 
113 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (2006).  “The heart of the House-Senate compromise [regarding 
whether FCC had total authority over tower siting], embodied in Section 704, is that states and 
localities can regulate the placement of wireless towers but cannot prohibit them.” Eagle, supra note 
111, at 466. 
114 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv)(2006); Matthew N. McClure, Comment, Working Through the 
Static: Is There Anything Left to Local Control in the Siting of Cellular and PCS Towers After the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996?,  44 VILL. L. REV. 781, 788 (1999). 
115 Matthew K. Schettenhelm, Accelerated Wireless Build-Out: Responding to DAS and “Shot 
Clock,” 8 (Apr. 2011), http://www.millervaneaton.com/WirelessBuildout.pdf (citing NextG Networks 
of Cal., Inc. v. City of Newport Beach, No. SACV 10-1286, 2011 WL 717388, (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 
2011)); see infra note 223. 
116 See Sara A. Evans, Note, Wireless Service Providers v. Zoning Commissions: Preservation of 
State and Local Zoning Authority Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 32 GA. L. REV. 965, 974 
n.39 (1998) (observing that “[i]n 1981 the Federal Communications Commission [FCC] made its first 
invitation to telephone service providers to apply for licenses to provide cellular services in 306 
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the majority of telephone calls were intrastate, the state-controlled system 
worked well.  Initially, ninety-eight percent of telephone calls were in-state 
and forty-five states had local regulatory commissions.
117
  Additionally, 
both local and long-distance telephones were considered natural 
monopolies, and because of this shared assumption, the FCC and the states 
regulated in a similar, consistent manner with little conflict.
118
  But the 
dynamic development surrounding the telecommunications industry began 
to change.  By 1996, the number of cellular customers in the United States 
grew from zero to 44 million, with the number of cellular users having 
risen to over 128 million by 2001, and almost 332 million by 2011.
119
  This 
increased demand in cellular use led to a call for more wireless 
communications towers.  In fact, the more wireless towers that were added 
to the network, the more valuable the network became.  These “network 
effects,”120 facilitated more demand, as well as increased management and 
coordination needs.  And as scholars have observed, “[t]hese increases in 
the value of network membership not only confer benefits upon existing 
users, but also encourage additional users to join, which in turn drives up 
the value of network membership even further.”121 
Second, increasing monopoly power led to calls for the federal 
government to deregulate the telecommunications industry in an effort to 
encourage competition and decrease prices.
122
  In the 1950s, the FCC 
began to introduce competition into certain established areas of 
communications, and courts provided the FCC with expanded jurisdiction 
over new services, even if they could be characterized as intrastate 
communications.
123
  In the 1960s and 1970s, economists and policymakers 
                                                                                                                          
metropolitan service areas and 428 rural areas” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  “New innovations 
in cellular technology have led to the development of digital phones and combined handset technology 
called Personal Communications Services (PCS).”  Id.  
117 Daniel A. Lyons, Technology Convergence and Federalism: Who Should Decide the Future of 
Telecommunications Regulation?, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM, 383, 389 (2010).  
118 McLaughlin, supra note 104, at 2221. 
119 U.S. Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/aid/10323 
(last visited May 27, 2012).   
120 David S. Law & Mila Versteeg,  The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 
CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1183 (2011) (an economic description of a market good that increases in value as 
the size of the network increases). 
121 Id. 
122 See Eagle, supra note 111, at 461 (noting that the TCA is “an omnibus overhaul of the federal 
regulation of communications companies, intended ‘to provide for a pro-competitive, deregulatory 
national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced 
telecommunications and information technologies and services . . . by opening all telecommunications 
markets to competition’” (quoting Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 637 (2d Cir. 1999)));  
see also David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to Which Communities Will Climb to 
Prevent the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. CORP. L. 469, 476–77 (1998) (discussing exceptions in the 
Communications Act which limit local government authority).  Evolving perceptions on monopolies 
contributed largely to states’ loss of regulatory control over the industry.   
123 McLaughlin, supra note 104, at 2221.  
 242 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:217 
concluded that not all telecommunications were a natural monopoly, and 
that AT&T was exploiting its monopoly over local telephone service in 
order to prevent competition in other aspects of telecommunication service, 
such as long-distance.
124
  Finally, in 1982, the long-distance monopoly of 
AT&T ended, although it continued for local telephone service.
125
  To add 
to the confusion, there was also inconsistency in court decisions 
concerning the boundary of FCC and state power.
126
  Arguing for the 
passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress referred to the 
telecommunications industry as an “economic apartheid” and referenced 
how a small number of companies commanded various sectors of the 
industry.
127
 
Third, “the federal goals of the [Telecommunications Act of 1996] 
translate into a mandate for thousands of new antennas to emerge across 
the country, touching every community that the telecommunications 
industry serves.”128  Wireless telecommunication facilities were a catalyst 
for a wave of NIMBYism, creating obstacles to wireless providers that 
sought zoning board approval of siting applications.
129
  Federal 
involvement was seen as necessary to prevent states and localities from 
interfering with the development of the wireless communications network.   
In sum, the authority over wireless infrastructure tipped from state 
control towards increased federal control in light of an explosion in new 
cellular use across interstate lines, a national interest in enhancing 
competition by deregulating the industry, and a desire to prohibit states 
from imposing state regulations that limit the siting of wireless 
communications infrastructure.
130
 
D.  Electricity Transmission Tip 
The last example of Congress altering the balance of power over siting 
rests with the siting of electricity transmission lines.  As opposed to the 
                                                                                                                          
124 Lyons, supra note 117, at 389. 
125 See McLaughlin, supra note 104, at 2221 (noting that “[t]hirty years of antitrust inquiries and 
litigation against AT&T culminated in a 1982 consent decree known as the Modification of Final 
Judgment (MFJ)”).  
126 See id. at 2214 (“A large body of case law has developed as courts have attempted to specify 
the limits of federal and state power.  Most disputes have been sparked by the problem noted in 
Louisiana PSC, namely, that the same physical equipment is used for both intrastate and interstate 
communications.”).  
127 142 CONG. REC. S686 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (Telecommunications Act of 1996 Conference 
Report). 
128 Tan, supra note 108, at 466. 
129 Peter M. Degnan et al., The Telecommunications Act of 1996: § 704 of the Act and Protections 
Afforded the Telecommunications Provider in the Facilities Siting Context, 3 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (noting that “this wireless telecommunications revolution has encountered 
significant resistance at the grassroots level . . . [leading to] a ‘not in my backyard’ attitude towards the 
infrastructural requirements associated with cellular telephone service”). 
130 See supra Part III.C. 
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siting of electricity generation, which involves consideration of the source 
of our electricity, the siting of transmission lines is about how to connect 
the sources of our electricity to the existing grid and transport the 
electricity generated to the distribution lines.  Traditionally, state, rather 
than federal, authorities retained the power to review proposals for electric 
transmission lines.
131
  Like the natural gas industry, the federal government 
became involved in the regulation of interstate pricing of the commodity.  
Just as it did with natural gas, in 1935, Congress amended the FPA to 
provide the FPC with jurisdiction over the pricing of electricity in 
interstate commerce.
132
  But unlike the NGA, which provided the federal 
government with control over the siting of interstate pipelines, the FPA 
provides the states with sole authority over all siting decisions with respect 
to generation, transmission, and distribution facilities.
133
  More 
specifically, “[s]tates have exclusive jurisdiction over transmission siting, 
and the FERC has no authority under the FPA to order the construction or 
expansion of transmission facilities, nor does it have authority to approve 
transmission siting.”134   
                                                                                                                          
131 Tara Benedetti, Running Roughshod? Extending Federal Siting Authority over Interstate 
Electric Transmission Lines, 47 HARV. J. LEGIS. 253, 253 (2010) (“While states have historically 
controlled the siting of interstate electric transmission lines, many federal legislators and regulators 
believe stronger federal authority over siting is necessary.” (footnote omitted)); see also Piedmont 
Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The states have traditionally assumed all 
jurisdiction to approve or deny permits for the siting and construction of electric transmission 
facilities.”).  
132 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2006); see Sovacool, supra note 49, at 446. 
133 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2006); see Sovacool, supra note 49, at 446 (“The 
Federal Power Act of 1935 gave the Federal Power Commission . . . jurisdiction over the interstate sale 
and transmission of electricity at the wholesale level, but left explicit jurisdiction of electricity 
transmission and sale at the retail level, creating separate roles for each level of government.”).  State 
public utility commissions generally issue the requisite certificate of need and site permit with route 
approvals, and address the proper allocation of costs of the new lines amongst ratepayers.  See, e.g., 
Press Release, Great River Energy, CapX2020 Granted Certificate of Need for 345-kilovolt Projects in 
Minnesota (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/16/idUS206762+16-
Apr-2009+BW20090416 (highlighting the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission grant of a certificate 
to construct electronic transmission lines in Minnesota); Press Release, Minnesota Public Utilities 
Commission, Minnesota Public Utilities Commission Approves Need for, and Route of, Hiawatha 
Transmission Lines (Jan. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.puc.state.mn.us/portal/groups/public/documents/pdf_files/013647.pdf (highlighting the 
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission approval of a certificate for the Hiawatha transmission lines). 
134 Hoang Dang, New Power, Few New Lines: A Need for a Federal Solution, 17 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 327, 329 (2002); see also Notice of National Transmission Grid Study 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 
47460, 47461 (Sept. 12, 2001) (“[T]he existing regime for siting and permitting of transmission 
facilities remains fundamentally state based.  This regime may not be well adapted to reviewing 
proposed new transmission facilities from a regional perspective.  The policy options for addressing 
transmission siting and permitting in a restructured electricity industry fall into three major categories: 
(1) Options to establish regional or federal siting institutions with authority to obtain rights–of–way for 
new transmission projects; (2) options to improve the existing state–based regime for transmission 
siting; and (3) options that could improve siting practices by government agencies and the electricity 
industry under any governance structure.”). 
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As technology and the production, distribution, and consumption of 
electricity changed over the twentieth century, however, Congress took a 
step toward expanding the federal role in the siting of transmission lines.  
In 2005, Congress expanded FERC’s jurisdiction over the siting of 
transmission lines in certain instances by means of Section 216 of the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct”).135  Specifically, in areas of the 
country designated as high congestion areas by the Department of 
Energy,
136
 where a state withholds approval on a transmission line, FERC 
may exercise federal backstop authority to approve the transmission line.
137
  
FERC interpreted Section 216 to mean that the federal agency may 
intervene in siting decisions where the state takes no action, as well as 
those situations where the state rejects a transmission line.
138
   
This federal backstop authority has been effectively neutered by the 
courts.  The courts have dismissed FERC’s interpretation as too broad,139 
and have rejected the DOE’s only two congestion designations, which are 
necessary preconditions to federal exercise of this backstop authority.
140
  
As of the time of this writing, FERC has failed to exercise this backstop 
authority to enable additional transmission lines to be constructed.  Despite 
the failure to effectively enhance the federal power over transmission line 
siting, there was a congressional intent to do so.   
Explanations for the partial tip towards federal control over 
transmission lines can all be traced to a growing national interest in 
investing in transmission infrastructure.  More specifically, the tip can be 
                                                                                                                          
135 Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)(2) (2006). 
136 Congress explicitly provided for federal authority to designate specific areas, known as 
national interest electric transmission corridors, as a solution to transmission congestion.  Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824p.  EPAct also grants FERC the authority to construct or modify 
these corridors by issuing permits and relying on the doctrine of eminent domain.  See Mark A. de 
Figueiredo, Note, A Regulatory Framework for Investments in Electricity Transmission Infrastructure, 
26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 445, 446 n.8 (2008) (“In order to issue a construction permit in a national interest 
corridor, FERC must find that ‘a State in which the transmission facilities are to be constructed or 
modified does not have authority to . . . approve the siting or facilities.’” (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 
824p(b)(1)(A))). 
137 Id. 
138 See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 2009) (“On November 16, 
2006, FERC issued its final rule, which . . . interpreted the phrase to include a state’s denial of a permit 
within the one-year statutory time frame.”).  
139 Id. at 309–10.  The Fourth Circuit rejected FERC’s interpretation, limiting their backstop 
authority to those cases where a state has taken no action on the siting of transmission lines and 
expressly rejected the idea that FERC could overrule a state’s rejection of transmission lines.  Id. at 
313–15.  As a result, any sophisticated state could thwart federal efforts to intervene in transmission 
line siting decisions with a mere “no,” and any attempt to increase federal involvement in the siting of 
transmission lines fails.  Notably, there are four other ways that the federal government could exert its 
authority under section 216(b)(2)–(6). 16 C.F.R. § 824p(b)(2)–(6)(2006). 
140 Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1095 (9th Cir. 2011) (vacating 
congestion areas on procedural grounds for a failure to properly consult with the states as required by 
the FPA Section 216). 
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attributed to a need to expedite the siting of transmission lines.  House and 
Senate reports pointed to delays in state regulatory approval of new 
transmission lines and lack of siting coordination among the states as 
reasons for including electric transmission provisions in the EPAct.
141
  Just 
as Congress was trying to encourage the telecommunications industry by 
passing the Telecommunications Act, Congress passed the EPAct in an 
attempt “to address the under-investment in electricity transmission 
infrastructure.”142   
Increased energy demand was also leading to congestion on the 
existing lines,
143
 thereby threatening the reliability of the grid.  Justifying 
the addition of this new Section 216 to the FPA, Congress noted that “[t]he 
states have traditionally assumed all jurisdiction to approve or deny 
permits for the siting and construction of electric transmission  
facilities. . . .  In recent times[,]  increasing concerns have been expressed 
about the capacity and reliability of the grid.”144  A House report pointed to 
the August 2003 blackout that hit the Northeast and Midwest as a 
demonstration of the lack of reliability in the electricity transmission 
system, highlighting the need for legislation that addressed issues of 
“transmission capacity, operation, and reliability.”145  The growing gap 
between energy supply and demand also created concerns in Congress 
about national energy security.
146
   
Furthermore, siting issues associated with transmission lines are 
particularly susceptible to interstate conflict.  When the proposed 
transmission line will traverse multiple states, the utility company must 
obtain separate approvals from each state.
147
  If the line is located across 
                                                                                                                          
141 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-215, pt. 1, at 171 (2005) (stating that “state regulatory approval delays 
siting of new transmission lines by many years”); S. REP. NO. 109-78, at 8 (2005) (stating that 
“[u]ncertainty in the marketplace about the rules and regulations that will govern generation and 
transmission facilities contributes to financial instability and endangers reliability of service”).  
142 Figueiredo, supra note 136, at 446; see also Dang, supra note 134, at 327 (“New power, few 
new lines.  This simple statement sums up the present situation facing the electricity industry as it 
moves from a highly regulated, monopolistic industry towards a deregulated, competitive one.”). 
143 National Electric Transmission Congestion Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,992, 57,702–04 (Oct. 5, 
2007). 
144 Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 310 (2009) (discussing the concerns which 
prompted Congress to enact § 216 of the FPA). 
145 H.R. REP. NO. 109-215, pt. 1, at 171 (2005); see also Carol M. Rose, Rethinking 
Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 Duke L.J. 1, 9 (1991) 
(discussing regulation of a resource as one way of managing congestion).  
146 See S. REP. NO. 109-78, at 6 (2005) (“A combination of energy production, conservation, 
efficiency, and development of new technologies is the bedrock of a sound energy policy aimed at 
closing the supply and demand imbalance.  Such a policy is necessary to ensured the country’s 
continued growth and prosperity and to protect our national security.”).  
147 See, e.g., Debbie Swanstrom & Meredith M. Jolivert, DOE Transmission Corridor 
Designations & FERC Backstop Siting Authority: Has the Energy Policy Act of 2005 Succeeded in 
Stimulating the Development of New Transmission Facilities?, 30 ENERGY L.J. 415, 451 (2009) 
(explaining that the Devers PV2 project required approval from both California and Arizona).  
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three states, “the states on either end can demonstrate to their constituents 
what the benefits of that transmission line will be, but the state in the 
middle has a very difficult time demonstrating the benefit. So, it’s almost 
impossible to get the line built and approved.”148  The most famous case 
may be what has been referred to as the “extension cord” case, where 
Arizona rejected a proposal by a California utility to construct a 210-mile 
power line between Arizona and California.
149
  One of the latest 
development projects, Centennial West Clean Line, is working to avoid a 
reprise of the extension cord case, as its proposed 900-mile transmission 
line is planned to extend from New Mexico through Arizona to 
California.
150
  Some states have embarked on efforts to centralize 
transmission line siting up to the regional level, reflecting an understanding 
of some of the inefficiencies of piecemeal transmission line siting on a 
state level.
151
  
As with telecommunications, the congressional tip consisted not of 
complete preemption, but a more limited form of federal control through 
the imposition of federal backstop authority.  This may be in part because 
of the active involvement of the FERC to try to address some of these 
federal issues on the margins.
152
  Siting over wireless infrastructure tipped 
for a number of reasons, including a furtherance of a national purpose and 
a desire to expedite the siting and to address potential security and 
reliability issues.   
In sum, each of the infrastructure siting regimes discussed above 
involved a tipping point in the balance of power between the states and the 
federal government.  Each of these commonplace infrastructure siting 
regimes discussed above started with state or local control.  In each, the 
justifications for centralized authority were growing, but none of the 
regimes possessed all five justifications.  And in each of these regimes, 
agency action to provide an escape valve for growing pressure on the prior 
                                                                                                                          
148 Dang, supra note 134, at 339 (citations omitted). 
149 In Re S. Cal. Edison Co., 2007 WL 2126365, at *1–2, *6–7 (Ariz. C.C. June 6, 2007). 
150 Clean Line Energy Partners, Project Description, CENTENNIAL WEST CLEAN LINE, 
http://www.centennialwestcleanline.com/site/page/project_description (last visited June 23, 2012). 
151 Various mechanisms exist to aid in coordination, including Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs) and Independent System Operators (ISOs), the National Association of 
Regulatory Commissioners’ (NARUC) affiliate groups, the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC), and Interstate Compacts.  NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELECTRICITY POL’Y, 
COORDINATING INTERSTATE ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION SITING: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DEBATE 14–
18 (2008); see also NEW ENGLAND STATES COMM. ON ELECTRICITY, PRESS RELEASE: NEW ENGLAND 
STATES FORM INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION SITING COLLABORATIVE (June 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.nescoe.com/uploads/Interstate_Siting_Collaborative.pdf (discussing the New England 
Committee on Electricity whose purpose is “to consider and to implement as appropriate means to 
increase coordination of states’ siting processes required for interstate transmission facilities in New 
England”). 
152 See infra note 278.   
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state-controlled regimes was limited, resulting in formal congressional 
action that tipped the balance of power from state toward more enhanced 
federal power.   
IV.  NO TIP IN ELECTRICITY GENERATION SITING 
Standing in stark contrast to the other infrastructure siting regimes 
discussed, control over the siting of electricity generation remains firmly 
with the states.  This continued state or local control over siting of 
electricity generation is particularly surprising given the similarities 
between the siting of electricity generation and the other infrastructure 
siting regimes.  As with railroads, natural gas, wireless, and electricity 
transmission, authority over the type and location of electricity generation 
originally rested with the states.
153
  And as with the other regimes, there are 
a number of federalism justifications for centralized authority, many of 
which can be made (of varied strength) based on the traditional 
justifications for centralized authority.  This section applies each of the five 
traditional justifications for centralized federal authority discussed above to 
the siting of electricity generation, demonstrating the similarities between 
the centralized justifications that resulted in enhanced federal control in the 
other regimes and those that apply to the siting of electricity generation: (1) 
transboundary issues across state lines that create externalities; (2) the need 
for uniformity or harmonization; (3) under-regulation that can result in a 
race to the bottom between states, threatening state public safety and 
welfare; (4) overregulation that can result from NIMBY scenarios, 
threatening national public safety and welfare; and (5) the provision of 
public goods that require resource pooling.
154
   
A.  Transboundary Applied to Generation Siting 
In some respects, the interstate nature of railroads, pipelines, and 
transmission lines presents a stronger case for federal control than the 
intrastate siting of generation.  Railroads and transmission lines are more 
likely to cross over state lines than a coal plant or a natural gas plant.  Even 
the siting of wireless telecommunications towers, although purely 
intrastate, has network effects that could justify a federal presence.
155
 
But a physical cross over interstate lines is not necessary to trigger the 
need for federal control.  In fact, the traditional case for federal control 
based on transboundary issues involves an activity that exists solely 
                                                                                                                          
153 States and localities have long controlled the source of generation within their borders, and 
Congress affirmed this authority in 1935 when it amended the Federal Power Act to provide the states 
with exclusive jurisdiction over the siting of generation.  Dang, supra note 134, at 329.    
154 Friedman, supra note 25, at 406. 
155 See supra notes 120–21. 
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intrastate but imposes externalities on other states.  For example, although 
the choice to construct a new coal plant may be advantageous for a given 
state in terms of economic growth, this decision can impose external costs 
on the rest of the country.  Differing levels of both traditional pollutants 
and greenhouse gases (“GHG”) are associated with the different types of 
generation, and states that are downwind of fossil-fuel fired plants endure 
more externalities than states that are downwind of wind farms.  In at least 
this respect, more centralized control over the type of electricity generated 
can be justified by the transboundary issues associated with differing levels 
of environmental externalities imposed on neighboring states.
156
         
B.  Uniformity Applied to Generation Siting 
Although some of the regulated industries analyzed called for 
uniformity or harmonization as a means to address perceived obstacles 
caused by state regulation, this justification for centralized control does not 
have a lot of traction when applied to the siting of electricity generation.  
This section analyzes two of the primary catalysts for uniformity in the 
other siting regimes: (1) calls for uniformity by the regulated community; 
and (2) a need to assist in coordinated planning.  
First, tips toward federal control in some of the other siting regimes 
were prompted by the regulated community.  For instance, even after the 
passage of the Transportation Act, representatives of railroad companies 
continued to advocate for federal oversight, citing state regulation as a 
source of confusion and a barrier to transportation system development.
157
  
Similarly, developers of transmission lines began to call for increased 
federal siting authority.
158
  Other calls for uniformity occurred in the other 
                                                                                                                          
156 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (2006) (noting that the “Good 
Neighbor Provision” gives EPA the power to cut down interstate pollution that interferes with the 
attainment and maintenance of the national ambient air quality standards protecting public health). 
157 See Proposed Amendment to Transportation Act, 1920: Hearings Before the Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives on H.R. 6861 and H.R. 8131, 67th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 554 (1922) (statement of Howard Elliot, Chairman of Northern Pacific Railway and 
Member of the Executive Committee of the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad) (arguing 
before the House of Representatives that “[t]he railroad executives as a whole . . . by force of the drift 
in this country toward nationalization of some of these great agencies, have practically as a unit come 
to the conclusion that if you are going to have a first-class, adequate transportation machine, to serve all 
the people of all the States, and all the United States, you have got to have somebody who is supreme 
in this regulatory question, and that somebody must be the Nation rather than 48 independent bodies 
with no head to them”).  
158 NAT'L COMM'N ON ENERGY POL'Y, SITING CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE: AN 
OVERVIEW OF NEEDS AND CHALLENGES 9 (2006) (“The 1992 Energy Policy Act, for example, gave 
FERC greater jurisdiction over energy infrastructure decisions and placed a new emphasis on interstate 
and regional planning approaches to identify future infrastructure needs for both natural gas pipelines 
and electricity transmission systems.  In the past, federal agency involvement in siting projects 
occurred only after state and local permitting had begun, if at all. The revision of federal energy 
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regimes, but not at the behest of the regulated industry.
159
  One area of 
inconsistency that may prompt some calls for uniformity in the siting of 
electricity generation stems from the variety of state siting laws, many of 
which express different preferences for different types of generation.  
Some states have a direct mandate for a preference of new renewable 
energy sources
160
 and some states have a presumption in favor of fossil fuel 
energy sources.
161
  Although there is disparity in the state regulations that 
affect the type of generation built within their borders,
162
 the regulatory 
discrepancy is not sufficient to prompt utilities to seek federal 
involvement.  The absence of calls for federal involvement may also be 
attributable to the fact that the majority of utilities in the United States 
function within just one state.  Of the more than 3,273 traditional utilities, 
which includes investor-owned, publicly-owned, cooperatives, and federal 
utilities,
163
 the majority of investor-owned utilities operate in a single 
state.
164
 
Regardless, calls for federal intervention in the electricity generation 
regime are few and far between.
165
  Such calls may be less likely to occur 
                                                                                                                          
priorities to focus on interstate and regional issues, however, prompted significant shifts in 
jurisdiction.”). 
159 For instance, state railway commissioners acknowledged the need for centralized coordination.  
Proposed Amendment to Transportation Act, 1920, supra note 157, at 543 (statement of Mr. Howard 
Elliott, Chairman, Northern Pacific Railway and Member, Executive Committee of the New York, New 
Haven & Hartford Railroad, New York City) (testifying that a joint statement from the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the National Association of Railway and Utilities Commissioners stated in 
part that “[t]he prime essential to [cooperation between ICC and NARUC] is realization of the nature 
and difficulties of the common problem . . . [and that t]he State commissions realize that the railroads 
form a national transportation system which is not split into parts by State lines and that the public 
interest demands a rate structure, State and interstate, as simple and harmonious as practicable”). 
160 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 216B.2422 (2010) (stating that Minnesota’s explicit preference for 
renewable energy, and a non-renewable energy source may be approved only if it found that a 
renewable energy facility would not be in the public interest). 
161 See infra notes 184–85 and accompanying text. 
162 GARY D. ALLISON & JOHN L. WILLIAMS, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE: THE EFFECTS OF 
STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF RENEWABLE SOURCES OF ELECTRIC 
ENERGY 140–46, available at http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/rff-bck-allisonandwilliams-
statelaws.pdf (describing the centralized, traditional public interest, and market approaches to the siting 
of generation). 
163 Electric Power Industry Overview 2007, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/prim2/toc2.html (last visited July 1, 2012). 
164 See EEI U.S. Member Company Service Territories, EDISON ELEC. INST., 
http://www.eei.org/whoweare/ourmembers/USElectricCompanies/Documents/EEIMemCoTerrMap.pdf
 (last visited Jan. 5, 2012).  
165 Calls that do occur come from scholars as opposed to industry.  See, e.g., Uma Outka, The 
Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 257 n.73 (2011) (citing James T. Ramey & 
James P. Murray, Jr., Delays and Bottlenecks in the Licensing Process Affecting Utilities: The Role of 
Improved Procedures and Advance Planning, 1970 DUKE L.J. 25, 42 (1970), A. Dan Tarlock et al., 
Environmental Regulation of Power Plant Siting: Existing and Proposed Institutions, 45 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 502, 552 (1972)) (discussing examples of calls for federal intervention); Mason Willrich, The 
Energy-Environment Conflict: Siting Electric Power Facilities, 58 VA. L. REV. 257, 334–36 (1972) 
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within a fragmented industry such as the electricity generation industry.  
Even though there are trade associations that represent the utilities,
166
 in the 
electricity generation “industry,” the participating entities may be too 
diffuse to have common interests that align.  The electricity siting 
“industry” is composed of a number of different entities, including coal, 
natural gas, nuclear, solar, and wind.  Even the fossil fuel entities cannot 
agree on a strategy for their survival.
167
  One does not expect that the 
renewable energy generators would be sufficiently aligned with the fossil-
fuel generators to present a unified call to action.  In fact, within this broad 
swath of “industry,” some energy generators may benefit from local 
authority and some may benefit from more centralized authority, a fact that 
renders calls for uniformity extremely unlikely.  
Second, many of the other siting regimes were faced with 
inefficiencies that could be remedied by more centralized planning or 
permitting.  Centralized planning was seen as a remedy to railroads that 
were being constructed in piecemeal fashion without an eye towards 
efficient planning.
168
  And centralized governance was seen as a remedy 
for transmission lines that were being constructed without sufficient regard 
to broader planning goals.
169
  
Unlike many of the other regimes, the siting of electricity generation 
does not appear to have the same types of inefficiencies.  Despite expected 
delays associated with meeting these requirements, PUCs have been found 
to generally act promptly on applications for certificates of need.
170
   And 
more to the point, there is no indication that the federal government would 
be any more efficient at permitting generation than a state or local 
authority.  
Thus far, the federalism justifications for the siting of electricity 
                                                                                                                          
(offering a conceptual framework for expediting the siting process in response to increasing demand for 
electricity); Gregory J. Rigano, Note, The Solution to the United States’ Energy Troubles is Blowing in 
the Wind, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201, 204 (2010) (proposing that BOEM be the lead agency with 
“exclusive authority to approve or deny any application for the siting, construction, expansion, or 
operation of an offshore wind project”). 
166 See, e.g., About EEI, EDISON ELEC. INST., 
http://www.eei.org/whoweare/abouteei/Pages/default.aspx (last visited July 1, 2012). 
167 As EPA works towards more stringent controls affecting coal plants, even natural gas plants 
find themselves at odds with their fossil fuel competitors.  See infra Part VI.B. 
168 See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
169 The state of Colorado, for example, has considered creating a “statewide transmission siting 
and permitting framework for electric transmission facilities” to combat current “inconsistent processes 
and requirements among local governments, unnecessary delay, increased opportunity for litigation, 
increased costs . . . and inconsisten[cy] with the increasingly regional nature of the modern electric 
industry.”  DEP’T OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON STATEWIDE 
TRANSMISSION SITING AND PERMITTING 3 (Dec. 1, 2011), available at  
http://www.dora.state.co.us/puc/projects/TransmissionSiting/SB11-45/Report/SB11-
45TF_RptToGA_12-01-2011.pdf. 
170 Swanstrom & Jolivert, supra note 147, at 418. 
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generation do not appear as strong as they were in some of the other 
infrastructure siting regimes.  Yet the federalism literature is explicit that 
not all given justifications need to be present to justify a tip—even one 
would suffice.
171
 
C.  Race to the Bottom Applied to Generation Siting 
Perhaps the best example of a potential race to the bottom with the 
siting of electricity can be illustrated through Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (“RPS”).  An RPS requires utilities to obtain a certain 
percentage of their electricity generation from renewable energy.
172
  As 
there is no national RPS, each state has been left to its own devices to 
determine whether it wants to adopt a RPS.  The first RPS was adopted in 
1983 in Iowa
173
 and by 2010, twenty-nine states had binding RPS 
requirements.
174
   
But what of the other twenty-one states with no RPS requirements?  
Eight states have nonbinding goals, but thirteen states have no such 
requirement.
175
  One could argue that this could lead to a race to the 
bottom, where generators of fossil fuels flock to the states with less 
stringent renewable energy requirements.  More empirical analysis is 
needed to confirm this suspicion, but of the thirteen states with no RPS 
requirements, a number of them reside at the bottom of the ranking for 
installed non-hydropower renewable energy capacity.
176
 Furthermore, the 
thirteen states without RPS may be free-riding on the social benefits of 
renewable energy (e.g., abatement of GHGs and pollutants) that extend 
beyond the state borders of those with RPS.
177
  For many of the same 
reasons, scholars have criticized the decentralized, state-centered 
federalism that currently exists for RPS and climate change policies.
178
   
                                                                                                                          
171 See supra note 25. 
172 Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
1339, 1341–42 (2010). 
173 Id. at 1357. 
174 Ivan Gold & Nidhi Thakar, A Survey of State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Square Pegs 
for Round Climate Change Holes?, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 183, 189 (2010). 
175 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 163, at 4, 61 tbl.1.28.  The thirteen states with no 
RPS are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming.  Id.  
176 Id. at 35–36 tbl. 1.15; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RENEWABLE ENERGY ANNUAL 2009 45 tbl. 
1.20 (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/03482009.pdf. 
177 Federal involvement could also alleviate potential Dormant Commerce Clause 
vulnerabilities associated with an RPS that favors in-state generation.  See Complaint at 27–29 
North Dakota v. Swanson, No. 0:11-CV-3232, (D. Minn. 2011) (alleging a similar theory with 
respect to carbon reduction requirements contained in Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act). 
178 Sovacool, supra note 49, at 403–04 (explaining that decentralization facilitates interstate 
spillovers, provides a lack of uniformity for industry, provides no economies of scale, and promotes a 
race to the bottom between states). 
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D.  NIMBY Applied to Generation Siting 
NIMBY responses can be seen in many of the historical siting regimes, 
as well as in the electricity generation regime.  In the past, states and 
localities were often resistant to the sitings, and the federal government 
intervened to prevent the states and localities from being too stringent and 
creating an obstacle to the development of the relevant infrastructure.  
Congress partially preempted localities from preventing the siting of 
wireless towers and provided federal backstop authority for transmission 
lines if the states were dragging their feet in getting the lines sited.
179
  
Rising demand for wireless communications led to a national interest to 
promote cell tower growth.
180
  Centralized permitting was seen as a remedy 
to eliminate state or local opposition that was standing in the way of 
development.
181
  And rising demand for electricity led to a national interest 
to promote the creation of more transmission lines.
182
      
Similarly, the circumstances surrounding the siting of electricity 
generation are drastically different today than they were in 1935, when 
Congress established separate spheres for federal and state governments 
and affirmed state control over siting of electricity infrastructure.  The 
selection of resources used to supply the nation’s electricity now has more 
of a national impact than was previously envisioned.  For example, energy 
efficiency is touted as a cornerstone of national security efforts.
183
  The 
decision to site a fossil fuel plant is not just about jobs and local air 
pollution anymore.  The decision now has larger consequences associated 
with climate change, national security, and reliability of our electric grid. 
In electricity siting, some states have passed siting laws that have made 
it much more difficult for renewable energy to be sited within its borders.  
This phenomenon could be characterized as a NIMBY collective action 
problem.  For example, a utility applying for a non-coal energy facility in 
Pennsylvania must prove to the PUC that a coal energy generation facility 
is not reasonably suited for that site and that there is a strong probability 
that coal would be more costly.
184
  West Virginia’s Public Energy 
Authority Act states in part that “the health, happiness, safety, right of 
                                                                                                                          
179 See supra note 109. 
180 See Eagle, supra note 111, at 447–48, 461–62 (describing the rapid increase in demand for 
wireless communication technology and noting that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was 
“‘designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and 
information technologies and services’” (quoting Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 637 
(2d Cir. 1999))). 
181 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
182 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
183 Mark D. Mutschink, Facing the Future of Oil in U.S. Courts: A Recommendation for Changing 
the Bremen Doctrine on Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses, 63 SMU L. REV. 1343, 1345 
(2010). 
184 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 519 (2000). 
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gainful employment and general welfare of the citizens of this [s]tate will 
be promoted by the establishment . . . of coal fired electric generating 
plants and transmission facilities.”185  And Virginia law has tied the hands 
of the PUCs, prohibiting them from considering non-mandated 
environmental effects in their determination of whether a project is in the 
public convenience and necessity.
186
  This has resulted in the rejection of 
projects that take environmental concerns into account that were not 
mandated by environmental laws.
187
  The state siting processes for wind 
energy are similarly rife with examples of parochial tendencies.  For 
instance, a Kansas county board of commissioners adopted a zoning 
ordinance that prohibited commercial wind projects.
188
  And some state 
laws allow homeowner associations to reject solar power installations in 
certain circumstances.
189
  If there is value in the efficiency created by the 
federal government stepping in to prohibit state and local authority from 
posing an obstacle to the siting of wireless infrastructure, then the same 
efficiency may be realized by the federal government stepping in to 
prohibit state and local authorities from posing an obstacle to the siting of 
renewable generation.
190
  In these situations, federal intervention could be 
justified to remedy such parochial actions.
191
   
                                                                                                                          
185 W. VA. CODE § 5D-1-2 (West 2011). 
186 VA. CODE § 56-580 (West 2012). 
187 The Virginia Corporation Commission rejected Appalachian Power’s application for a $2.2 
billion dollar Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle “clean coal” plant.  Appalachian Power Co., 264 
P.U.R. 4th 308, 2008 WL 1822541 (Va. S.C.C. Apr. 14, 2008). 
188 “Land owners and wind rights holders filed suit, and in 2009 the Kansas Supreme Court 
upheld the county zoning ordinance, finding that the board’s decision to prohibit commercial wind was 
within its legislative discretion, and that it was reasonably supported by the record.  The court noted 
that a total ban might be ‘unwise’ but was not illegal.”  ENVTL L. INST., STATE ENABLING 
LEGISLATION FOR COMMERCIAL-SCALE WIND POWER SITING AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ROLE 7 
(2011), available at http://www.elistore.org/reports_detail.asp?ID=11410. 
189 North Carolina law that provides that city and county ordinances may prohibit the installation 
of solar energy collectors that that are visible from the ground and installed: 
(1) On the facade of a structure that faces areas open to common or public access; 
(2) On a roof surface that slopes downward toward the same areas open to common 
or public access that the facade of the structure faces; or (3) Within the area set off 
by a line running across the facade of the structure extending to the property 
boundaries on either side of the facade, and those areas of common or public access 
faced by the structure. 
Gen. Assemb. N.C. 1387, 2009., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009); see also Hannah Wiseman, Expanding 
Regional Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477, 508 (2011). 
190 See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 289, 292–93 (2011) (noting that by placing constraints on local siting decisions, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 has succeeded in dramatically increasing the number of cell towers). 
191 See Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New 
Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1051–52 (2009) (arguing for 
federal constraints on state siting processes that restrict wind development). 
 254 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:217 
E.  Public Goods Applied to Generation Siting 
Since at least the Federalist Papers, danger has been a justification for 
federal involvement.  In assuaging the fears of the anti-Federalists, James 
Madison explained that “[t]he operations of the federal government will be 
most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the State 
governments, in times of peace and security.”192   
How one interprets “danger” alters the arguments for an enhanced 
federal role in the context of the siting of electricity.  Where danger is 
narrowly interpreted to mean only that associated with war from foreign 
nations, the argument for enhanced federal involvement is limited.  Some 
historians attribute the tip from state to federal control in the railroad 
industry to fallout from the Civil War.
193
  As was noted earlier, Congress 
relied on emergencies resulting from the war as justifications for federal 
control over the railroads.
194
  There was also an element of danger 
associated with allowing liquefied natural gas to be stored in tankers as 
opposed to on onshore terminals,
195
 a factor that may have contributed to 
the complete federal preemption of the siting of liquefied natural gas 
terminals to receive these tankers.
196
  Under this narrow construction of 
danger, there may be little argument that the intrusion of the federal 
government into the siting of electricity infrastructure is unwarranted.   
But where danger is more broadly interpreted to include a range of 
threats to the health and happiness of the United States,
197
 a number of 
arguments can be made to support an enhanced federal role with respect to 
the siting of renewable energy.  First, renewable energy can be viewed as 
an undersupplied public good.  The comparatively better environmental 
and health benefits associated with renewable energy as opposed to fossil 
fuel energy are social benefits that are not fully captured by the private 
costs of renewable energy.  Second, renewable energy can be viewed as a 
good essential to grid reliability, a national need that states may not have 
sufficient resources to provide.  The growing gap between energy supply 
and demand created concerns in Congress about national energy 
security,
198
 as was evidenced by prior blackouts
199
 and delays in state 
                                                                                                                          
192 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 263 (James Madison) (ABA ed., 2009). 
193 Ely, supra note 63 at 965–67 (noting that “calls for federal control of the rail industry steadily 
mounted after the Civil War”).   
194 See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.  
195 See James A. Fay, Spills and Fires from LNG and Oil Tankers in Boston Harbor, GREEN 
FUTURES (Aug. 26, 2003), http://www.greenfutures.org/projects/LNG/Fay.html (showing that accident 
to an LNG tanker in Boston Harbor could cause almost instantaneous fires that would be beyond the 
capabilities of any existing firefighting technique and would bring catastrophic damage). 
196 See supra note 87. 
197 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 259 (James Madison) (ABA ed., 2009) (“[T]he public good . . . is 
the supreme object to be pursued.”).  
198 S. REP. NO. 109-78, at 6 (2005). 
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regulatory approval of new transmission lines.
200
  Notably, even the FPA 
provides an exception to state control over the siting of electricity 
infrastructure in times of war or a shortage of generation facilities.
201
 
Under this broader construction of danger, many arguments exist as to 
the dangers posed by climate disruption from the combustion of fossil 
fuels.
202
  Environmental disasters have often been the impetus for calls for 
federal involvement, including releases of noxious fumes,
203
 the Santa 
Barbara oil spill,
204
 and coal ash waste.
205
 
                                                                                                                          
199 H.R. REP. NO. 109-215, pt. 1, at 171 (2005).  
200 Id.; S. REP. NO. 109-78, at 8 (2005). 
201 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c) (providing that if FERC determines that there is an emergency in wartime 
or because of a shortage of facilities for the generation of electric energy, it has the authority “to require 
by order . . . such generation . . . of electric energy as in its judgment will best meet the emergency and 
serve the public interest”). 
202 See infra notes 282–84 and accompanying text;  RICHARD B. ALLEY ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 5, 7 (2007) (“[W]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, as 
is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread 
melting of snow and ice, and rising global mean sea level. . . . At continental, regional, and ocean basin 
scales, numerous long-term changes in climate have been observed.  These include changes in Arctic 
temperatures and ice, widespread changes in precipitation amounts, ocean salinity, wind patterns and 
aspects of extreme weather including droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and the intensity of 
tropical cyclones.” (footnote omitted)); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 507 (2007) 
(acknowledging climate change disruption).  Although oil is not a primary resource for electricity, 
similar danger exists with respect to oil.  See CNA, POWERING AMERICA’S DEFENSE: ENERGY AND THE 
RISKS TO NATIONAL SECURITY vii (2009) (identifying the risks to national security created by 
America’s energy policies and practices, including how “U.S. dependence on oil weakens international 
leverage, undermines foreign policy objectives, and entangles America with unstable or hostile 
regimes,” and how “overreliance on oil burdens the military [and] undermines combat effectiveness”).  
Further, some of the revenue made through U.S. purchases of petroleum is used to fund terrorism 
activities aimed to disrupt U.S. interests.  Id. at 4. 
203 One of the first incidents to raise awareness of the need for federal control over air pollution 
was a disaster in the small town of Donora, Pennsylvania.  In 1948, a zinc mill released a plume of 
noxious smoke that killed twenty residents.  Devra Lee Davis & Carrie Forrester, Past and Present 
Environmental Health Challenges in Southwestern Pennsylvania: Some Comments on the Right to a 
Clean Environment, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 305, 309, 312 (2004).  By 1955, Congress passed the Air 
Pollution Control Act to gather information on “the causes and effects of air pollution.”  Id. at 316.  
Twelve years later, Congress passed the Federal Air Quality Act and the Clean Air Act in 1970.  Id. at 
317.  Today, a plaque memorializing the tragedy states: “[m]ajor Federal clean air laws became a 
legacy of this environmental disaster that focused national attention on air pollution.”  Id. at 316.   
204 The Santa Barbara oil spill occurred in 1969 and is widely credited as the impetus for passage 
of major federal environmental legislation including the National Environmental Policy Act.  Keith C. 
Clarke & Jeffrey J. Hemphill, The Santa Barbara Oil Spill: A Retrospective, 64 Y.B. OF THE ASS’N OF 
PAC. COAST GEOGRAPHERS 157, 157–62 (Darrick Dana ed., Univ. of Haw. Press 2002).  Described by 
President Nixon as a disaster that “frankly touched the conscience of the American people,” the federal 
government admitted that it “had largely ignored the need to protect commercial, recreational, 
aesthetic, and ecological values of the area.” California v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 
2002) (quoting Clarke & Hemphill, supra at 160). 
205 States retain authority over coal ash waste, a byproduct of the coal production process.  In 
2008, the Tennessee Valley Authority’s Kingston Fossil Plant released 5.4 million cubic yards of toxic 
coal sludge onto 300 acres of surrounding land, an environmental disaster that many thought was sure 
to prompt federal regulation of the residue.  Matthew Pearl, The Aftermath of the December 2008 
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Where the federal government can provide assurances of its 
commitment to renewable resources to better insulate the nation from the 
dangers posed by the current energy policies, consensus of the dangers 
may justify a tip from state to enhanced federal control over the siting of 
electricity generation.   
In sum, while the federalism virtues in support of centralized control 
over the siting of electricity generation do not stack up uniformly in favor 
of a tip towards federal power, other infrastructure siting regimes tipped 
with similar justifications.  This suggests that there must be some other 
factor at play in the siting of electricity generation that does not exist with 
respect to the other infrastructure siting regimes. 
V.  FACTORS OFFSETTING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CENTRALIZATION 
By no means does the mere presence of one or more of these 
justifications for centralized authority guarantee that a particular regime 
will tip from state towards federal control.  There are a number of factors 
that may counter one or more of these federalism justifications supporting 
more centralized power.
206
  For purposes of this analysis, three such 
counterarguments to centralized power seem noteworthy, particularly with 
an eye towards trying to explain the disparity in tips between the siting of 
electricity and the siting of the other infrastructure. First, this Article 
assesses whether electricity siting realizes competing federalism virtues 
supporting decentralized control that the other siting regimes do not.  
Second, it explores whether authority remains with the states and localities 
                                                                                                                          
Incident in East Tennessee Illuminates the Inadequate Regulation of Coal Ash Impoundments, 16 U. 
BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 195–96 (2009).  But four years later, the federal government has yet to finalize 
its draft rule.  Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special 
Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals From Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35128 (proposed 
June 21, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 257, 261, 264, 265, 268, 271, 302).  
206 Included in this list would be theories that “lower levels of government serving smaller 
numbers of constituents have a comparative advantage in delivery of labor-intensive services, while 
higher-level governments with greater capital resources have a comparative advantage in delivering 
capital-intensive services where there are significant economies of scale,”  Hills, supra note 52, at 869, 
that the level of authority should match the level of the harm, Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, 
Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory 
Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996) (advocating that the level of environmental 
regulation should be matched to the level of environmental pollution and that local concerns should be 
resolved locally), and that state failures drive a tip towards federal control, see Percival, supra note 43, 
at 1144 (“Like civil rights law, environmental law became federalized only after a long history of state 
failure to protect what had come to be viewed as nationally important interests.”).  But see Jonathan H. 
Adler, The Fable of Federal Environmental Regulation: Reconsidering the Federal Role in 
Environmental Protection, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 93, 101–02 (2004) (rejecting the theory that states 
failed to protect environmental quality, and instead suggesting four alternative factors that played a role 
in the centralization of environmental law: (1) increased environmental consciousness after World War 
II; (2) the nationalization of American politics; (3) the delegitimization of states’ rights during the civil 
rights era; and (4) rent-seeking on the part of regulated entities).  
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because electricity siting decisions are uniquely decisions of a 
“traditionally local nature.”  Lastly, it considers whether elements of public 
choice theory can explain why rational, self-interested federal legislators 
may not see fit to tip the balance of power of electricity siting away from 
the states but may see fit to do so in the other siting regimes.  This section 
discusses each of these possible explanations in turn and explains why 
each fails to explain the resistance of the electricity siting regime to a tip.  
Although each of these theories has merit in explaining why any one 
infrastructure regime has tipped, their limits lie in their inability to inform 
a comparative analysis.   
A.  Decentralized Federalism Virtues Support State Control of the Siting of 
Electricity Generation 
Despite the presence of centralized federalism justifications supporting 
federal control over the siting of electricity generation, there may be equal 
or stronger decentralized federalism justification supporting state or local 
control.  A tip from federal to state or local authority is often justified on 
six grounds: (1) enhanced public participation in democracy;
207 
(2) better 
accountability; (3) state as laboratories for experimentation;
208
 (4) better 
protection of citizens’ health, safety, and welfare; (5) enhanced cultural 
and local diversity; and (6) diffused power to protect liberty.
209
   
Just as the federalism virtues supporting centralized authority can be 
used to justify enhanced federal control over the siting of electricity 
generation, the federalism virtues supporting decentralized authority can 
also be invoked to counter these arguments with support for state or local 
control.  And just as scholars have long relied on centralized federalism 
                                                                                                                          
207 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (noting that federalism “increases 
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and 
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in 
competition for a mobile citizenry”). 
208 See Friedman, supra note 25, at 389–405; John O. McGinnis, Laws for Learning in an Age of 
Acceleration, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 305, 307–08, 337–38 (2011) (arguing that decentralization will 
have benefits for “social learning” because states can experiment with different policies, citing as 
examples federal frameworks which allow states to come up with their own methods of achieving 
federal goals, including with healthcare through the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and 
education through the Race to the Top Program); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that “the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed” 
with guns in school zones, for the states may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to 
devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 
787–90 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Court's decision 
undermines the most valuable aspects of our federalism.  Courts and commentators frequently have 
recognized that the [fifty] States serve as laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and 
political ideas . . . . [F]ederalism [also] enhances the opportunity of all citizens to participate in 
representative government . . . . Finally, our federal system provides a salutary check on governmental 
power.”).  
209 Glicksman & Levy, supra note 24, at 600.    
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virtues to advocate for increased federal control over a number of areas, 
including environmental pollution,
210
 greenhouse gases,
211
 welfare,
212
 
transmission lines,
213
 corporate law,
214
 tort law,
215
 insurance,
216
 medical 
malpractice,
217
 and immigration,
218
 scholars use the presence of 
decentralized virtues to advocate for a tip toward state control, including 
                                                                                                                          
210 See, e.g., Percival, supra note 43, at 1172 (pointing to transboundary pollution, guarantees of 
minimum standards, economies of scale, and industry preference, for uniform regulations as reasons for 
the federalization of environmental regulation); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems 
of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 
1196, 1211–19 (1977) (explaining why centralization of environmental legislation is necessary in order 
to: (1) address the tragedy of the commons and realize national economies of scale; (2) mitigate the 
disparities in effective political representation; (3) correct market failures arising from pollution 
externalities; and (4) best take advantage of the public opinion that environmental regulation is the 
pursuit of “moral ideals” and assure that the sacrifices are shared).  
211 See, e.g., Joseph Forderer, State Sponsored Global Warming Litigation: Federalism Properly 
Utilized or Abused?, 18 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 62–63 (2010) (applying the federalism values 
to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Connecticut v. AEP to assess its furtherance of federalism). 
212 See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting 
for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 621 (1999) (arguing against the complete 
decentralization of welfare reform and advocating for an increased federal role in the form of national 
standards).    
213 See, e.g., Dang, supra note 134, at 328–29 (arguing that the Federal Power Act should be 
amended to give FERC the power to grant transmission siting approval and to mandate construction and 
expansion of the transmission grid); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Environmental Regulation, Energy, and 
Market Entry, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 167, 183 (2005) (arguing for an increased federal role, 
perhaps by a federal agency or federal courts with authority to override the decisions of state and local 
governments in certain decisions regarding siting); John Noor, Note, Herding Cats: What To Do When 
States Get in the Way of National Energy Policy, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 145, 175 (2009) (arguing that 
FERC should be granted siting authority for transmission projects involving renewable energy).  But 
see James A. Holtkamp & Mark A. Davidson, Transmission Siting in the Western United States: 
Getting Green Electrons to Market, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 379, 387 (2010) (arguing for a regional 
transmission siting process instead of a federal preemption of state siting requirements); Jim Rossi, The 
Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1041–43 
(2009) (arguing that expanding federal authority to transmission siting could “crowd out” conservation 
and efficiency at the state level and provide a means to transmit more power from dirty fuel sources).  
214 See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 
YALE L.J. 663, 663–64 (1974) (explaining the risk of a race-to-the-bottom effect under state control of 
corporate law and proposing a unifying, federal regime). 
215 Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism: Whatever Happened to Devolution?, 14 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 429, 432 (1996) (providing a “basis for federal intervention in tort law, resting 
upon sound constitutional theory and public policy”). 
216 See, e.g., Danielle F. Waterfield, Note, Insurers Jump on Train for Federal Insurance 
Regulation: Is It Really What They Want or Need?, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 283, 286 (2002) (noting the 
traditional state regulation of the insurance industry, followed by calls for federal intervention). 
217 See, e.g., Moncrieff, supra note 17, at 846–50 (arguing for federalization of medical 
malpractice to correct spillover effects resulting from federal spending on healthcare and that the need 
for administrative efficiency and correction of interstate externalities trumps arguments for state 
authority such as the traditional role of states in medical malpractice and the fact that medical 
malpractice is primarily a matter of local concern). 
218 See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of 
Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1673–76 (2011) (asserting that arguments for 
decentralization of immigration policy based on states acting as laboratories for experimentation are 
flawed because states do not internalize the costs of these laws or yield replicable results). 
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medical marijuana
219
 and environmental protection.
220
  This would suggest 
that the disparity between state control over generation siting and federal 
control over the other siting regimes might be explained by identifying 
decentralized virtues realized in electricity generation that are not realized 
in the other infrastructure siting regimes.  Unfortunately, these virtues do 
not appear to be unique to the siting of electricity generation and could 
easily apply to other siting regimes.  This section first provides some 
examples of the decentralized federalism virtues that can be realized by 
maintaining authority over the siting of electricity generation at a state and 
local level.
 221
  It then explains why use of the federalism virtues in this 
way have their explanatory limits, weakening their use in this type of 
comparative analysis.   
1. Decentralized Federalism Virtues 
A key benefit of decentralization is that local experts can be more 
flexible and adept at incorporating the area’s unique “temporal and 
geographic information . . . to design optimal policies.”222  This virtue, 
often referred to as the ability to better protect the health, safety, and 
welfare, is particularly relevant to the decision about where to site 
infrastructure.  All of the infrastructure analyzed involves some form of 
potential adverse local impacts, including aesthetic impacts, land use 
issues, and health issues.  An increased role for the federal government 
runs the risk of usurping the important role of the localities in determining 
                                                                                                                          
219 J. Mitchell Pickerill & Paul Chen, Medical Marijuana Policy and the Virtues of Federalism, 38 
PUBLIUS 22, 24 (2008) (concluding that the federal government should not assert preemptive 
jurisdiction over medical marijuana policy based on three “classic virtues” of federalism which support 
state authority: policy experimentation and innovation, diversity of policy preferences, and protection 
and enhancement of individual rights and liberties). 
220 See Sovacool, supra note 49, at 429–30 ( “[T]he case for devolution of environmental policy 
often rests on a set of four interconnected assumptions: (i) that decentralization induces 
experimentation and innovation; (ii) devolution provides more flexibility in responding to 
environmental problems; (iii) decentralization improves accountability and equity; and (iv) states will 
engage in welfare-enhancing competition to craft better environmental policies.”). 
221 Other decentralized virtues, like the ability to enhance public participation, are unlikely to be 
threatened by many forms of increased federal control.  Public participation may be minimal in any but 
the most controversial of PUC hearings.  See, e.g., Jeremy C. Ruark, PUC Taking Public Comments 
over PacificCorp Rate Hike Proposal, SEASIDE SIGNAL, Aug. 22, 2012, available at 
http://www.seasidesignal.com/news/article_9307aa70-ebdf-11e1-a185-0019bb2963f4.html (“[D]ue to 
extremely low attendance the PUC phased out public hearings involving this type of rate  
case . . . . Instead, the Commission is using public comment boxes on the PUC website linked to the 
rate cases so customers can weigh in when it is most convenient to them.”); see also PUC Aug. 21st 
Public Forum on Smart Meter Issues–Recap, BAN TEX. SMART METERS (Oct. 6, 2012), 
http://www.bantexassmartmeters.com (discussing the unexpectedly low attendance at a public forum of 
a contentious issue).  Even if local citizens can better participate in the siting process through hearings 
that take place locally as opposed to in a centralized hearing in Washington, D.C., there are ways to 
structure increased federal control in a way that still places the day-to-day hearings and ability of 
citizens to participate locally with the state PUCs. 
222 Sovacool, supra note 49, at 431. 
 260 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:217 
the type and location of the infrastructure.  It is the localities that are the 
ones that need to adjust any decreases in property values, tax implications, 
loss of views, or health or environmental impacts.  And it is the localities 
that may be able to best mitigate against such impacts.  For instance, 
aesthetics are a primary concern of those opposed to telecommunications 
facilities.
223
  The visual impact from towers may be minimized by 
disguising the towers as natural features such as trees,
224
 and some 
municipalities have required “stealth design” within the requisite 
performance standards for communication facilities.
225
   
An argument can be made that this need for local input is even more 
pronounced in the decisions about the siting of electricity generation than 
in decisions about the other types of infrastructure.  This is because the 
localities may care as much, if not more, about the type of generation to be 
built as they care about where the generator is built.  The type of 
generation built has a much greater diversity in impacts than the type of 
wireless tower or natural gas pipeline that is built.  For example, one type 
of railroad tracks brings the same types of land use, congestion, and 
pollution from the locomotives as the next type of railroad tracks.  And one 
type of telecommunications tower generally presents the same types of 
aesthetics, radio emissions, and environmental externalities as another.
226
   
In contrast, state public utility commissions are often faced with 
alternatives that are rife with trade-offs that the decentralized federalism 
virtues suggest is best determined by a local level of authority.   The 
generation of coal energy results in more greenhouse gas emissions than 
the generation of wind energy, but it is less costly and may result in less 
harm to endangered birds and bats.
227
  Cleaner-burning natural gas 
                                                                                                                          
223 See, e.g., VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix Cnty., 342 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(describing letters objecting to a “proposed tower because of aesthetic considerations [and] a petition 
from twelve residents living near the . . . site opposing the tower for aesthetic and other reasons”); Sw. 
Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 61 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Few people would argue that 
telecommunication towers are aesthetically pleasing.  Some of the disapproving comments in the cases 
about generalized aesthetic concerns refer to negative comments that are applicable to any tower, 
regardless of location.”). 
224 Mary Ann O’Toole Holley, ‘Stealth’ Tower Not So Stealthy, NEWSMAGAZINE NETWORK, Jan. 
13, 2011, http://www.newsmagazinenetwork.com/201101131471/stealth-tower-not-so-stealthy. 
225 OVERLAND PARK, KAN., MUNICIPAL CODE § 18.395.070 (2009). 
226 If anything, the federal jurisdiction over siting of such infrastructure has ensured even more 
uniformity in type.  The FCC, for example, has standardized radio frequency emissions such that 
telecommunications towers are not distinguished on this basis and the TCA stipulates that local 
governments may not base regulation of the wireless industry on health concerns.  Laurie Dichiara, 
Wireless Communication Facilities: Siting for Sore Eyes, 6 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 14 (1998).  And the 
FCC has recently addressed concerns over tower height and migratory bird populations by requiring 
that proposed towers over 450 feet tall conduct an environmental assessment.  47 C.F.R. § 1.1307 
(2012). 
227 In 2002, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service estimated 33,000 bird deaths annually from 
collisions with wind turbines.  U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, MIGRATORY BIRD MORTALITY 2 
(2002), available at www.fws.gov/birds/mortality-fact-sheet.pdf.  Since then, that estimate has 
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generation may be able to utilize cheap domestic resources, but can have 
significant impacts on the water quality and supply of the area.
228
  The 
generation of solar energy may be free from greenhouse gas emissions, but 
it is an intermittent resource that can affect the reliability of the grid.
229
  
The generation of nuclear energy may have near zero combustion 
emissions, but it is dependent on imported uranium and elicits public 
opposition because of real or perceived dangers particular to this method of 
generation.
230
  And the generation of large-scale renewable energy may 
have zero combustion emissions, but it is expensive and often involves 
extensive land use and endangered species issues.    
In fact, the unique geographic features of each state with respect to 
electricity generation weigh in particular favor of a decentralized 
framework.  Each state has its own unique geographic strengths related to 
energy production; some have high amounts of coal, some have consistent 
winds, and so on.  This has resulted in great variation in both the RPS 
adopted by the states,
231
 as well as variation in siting procedures, such as 
different size thresholds and different criteria that must be satisfied to 
begin construction.
232
   
A second decentralized virtue that may be realized by maintaining the 
current state-centered level of authority for the siting of electricity 
generation is the ability of state and local authorities to experiment with 
solutions more readily than federal authorities.  Local programs are 
credited as being a “positive contagion,” reacting faster to problems and 
                                                                                                                          
increased to 440,000.  See Umair Irfan, Bats and Birds Face Serious Threats from Growth of Wind 
Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/08/08/08climatewire-bats-
and-birds-face-serious-threats-from-gro-10511.html?ref=earth. 
228 New York City, for example, opposed natural gas drilling in the Marcellus Shale for years 
because of the likelihood that the increased industrial activity in the watershed and road construction 
will contaminate the unfiltered water supply of its eight million residents.  N.Y.C. DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
PROT., COMMENTS ON THE REVISED DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 1, 3 (Jan. 11, 2012), 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/pdf/natural_gas_drilling/nycdep_comments_on_rdsgeis_for_
hvhf_20120111.pdf. 
229 See Andrew Ratzkin, When the Wind Don't Blow, When the Sun Don't Shine: The Risks of 
Intermittency, 41 TRENDS, Sept./Oct. 2009, at 1, 12 (describing the risks associated with intermittent 
renewable sources, including their inability to be increased or decreased as demand dictates). 
230 See, e.g., U.S. N.R.C., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: THE NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE REVIEW OF INSIGHTS FROM THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI 
ACCIDENT 1 (2011) (describing the Fukushima accident and the need for new regulations to better 
protect public health and safety). 
231 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Hawaii: Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, 
DSIRE DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, available at 
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=HI06R&re=1&ee=1 (showing that 
renewable portfolio standards vary between ten percent (Wisconsin) and forty percent (Hawaii) in the 
percentage of renewables required, the timeframes for compliance, and what type of power qualifies as 
“renewable”). 
232 See supra notes 160–61; ALLISON & WILLIAMS, supra note 162, at 140–46. 
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spurring the federal government to overcome regulatory inertia.
233
  When 
the Supreme Court held that the FPA preempted state regulation of 
utilities, Justice Jackson stated: “If now and then some state does not 
regulate its utilities according to the federal standard, it may be a small 
price to pay for preserving the state initiative which gave us utilities 
regulation far in advance of federal initiative.”234  Indeed, state legislatures 
can be credited with responding to proposals to impose mandates for 
renewable energy faster than the federal government; state legislatures 
have passed over thirty-seven pieces of RPS legislation over the last 
twenty-eight years, while the federal government has failed over twenty-
five times to produce a national RPS.
235
   
2.  Limits of Decentralized Virtues for Explaining the Disparity 
Just as the centralized federalism virtues failed to sufficiently explain 
the disparity in authority between the siting of electricity generation and 
the siting of other infrastructures, similar limitations exist with respect to 
the decentralized federalism virtues.  Specifically, the use of these virtues 
to try to explain the disparity poses at least two fundamental problems, 
each described below. 
The first problem with using federalism virtues to justify either state or 
federal control is that the virtues rarely line up neatly on one side of the 
federalism–state federalism ledger.  Instead, we are often faced with an 
area of the law that is a kind of “hybrid,” one that exhibits characteristics 
of both decentralized and centralized power allocations.  What happens 
when the factors cut different ways?  For instance, what is the appropriate 
level of government when the particular area at issue presents a need to 
address transboundary issues, but there is also a benefit in states serving as 
laboratories for experimentation?  In these situations where the law can 
realize virtues on both sides of the ledger, there is no clear “prevailing” 
power level of authority and the federalism virtues lose much of their 
persuasive force towards either state or federal power.
236
     
Each of the siting regimes discussed reflects this type of hybrid that 
exhibits characteristics of both decentralized and centralized authority.  
The siting of infrastructure clings to many historical characteristics that 
                                                                                                                          
233 Sovacool, supra note 49, at 436–37. 
234 Power Comm’n v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 489 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
235 Davies, supra note 172, at 1341; State Funding Resources and Renewable Portfolio Standards, 
EPA (last updated Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/lmop/publications-tools/funding-guide/state-
resources/index.html. 
236 Although this may, in part, explain the rising popularity of cooperative federalism, advocates 
of cooperative federalism often fall short of providing details about how such shared authority should 
function.  See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, From Incongruity to Cooperative Federalism, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 845, 
865–73 (2006) (arguing for a cooperative federalism framework to govern corporation-shareholder 
relationships that envisions the federal government setting “minimal shareholder protections” and then 
leaves the issue of details to the states based on certain priorities, such as fighting fraud). 
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suggest a decentralized system is appropriate.  But contemporary siting 
regimes also reflect many characteristics that suggest some centralized 
authority may be in order.  There is no clear “prevailing” level of power 
indicated by the virtues, yet many of these regimes have tipped from state 
to enhanced federal control while the siting of generation remains in state 
control.  
In the end, it may not be the mere presence of the virtues, but degrees 
that matter.  Decisions about the proper balance of power may not rest with 
only the realization of virtues, but the degree to which each level of 
government can best realize the virtues.  Although the localized and 
diverse impacts associated with the siting of electricity may suggest that 
decentralized authority would better further the virtues of federalism in this 
context, the decisions regarding the type of generation constructed also 
impose externalities on other states, which suggests that centralization may 
be appropriate, creating a type of hybrid that fails to point conclusively 
towards state or federal control.  Importantly, the federalism virtues 
justifying decentralized control over the siting of electricity generation are 
no more unique than the federalism virtues justifying decentralized control 
over traditionally local areas.  Yet the other regimes, including railroads, 
natural gas pipelines, wireless communications, and electricity 
transmission are now governed by some form of shared or overlapping 
federal and state authority.   
Second, even if the virtues did line up neatly towards state or federal 
power, it is far from absolute that the presence of particular virtues renders 
the corresponding power allocation the best fit in all situations.  In fact, 
although these virtues align with either state or federal authority in theory, 
it is unclear that they align so neatly in practice.  As Barry Friedman has 
asserted:  
On the state side of the balance, we do not know whether 
retaining governmental authority at the subnational level 
fosters democracy, or even what we necessarily mean by this.  
We have not determined whether states really are laboratories 
for experimentation, and under what circumstances 
experimentation will flourish.  We do not know if state 
governance enhances accountability.  And so on.
237
   
For instance, although state authority is traditionally viewed as the 
most effective level of power to enhance public welfare, a more centralized 
level of government may sometimes be in a better position to provide for 
the public welfare of state citizens.
238
  Similarly, although the federal 
                                                                                                                          
237 Friedman, supra note 25, at 319. 
238 See infra notes 242–43 (describing West Virginia’s extreme reliance on coal despite studies 
that demonstrate it is a net cost to the state); see also Sabrina Tavernise, As Gas Drilling Spreads, 
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government is generally thought to be in a better position to provide 
uniformity, states can, even by loose agreement amongst themselves, 
realize the virtues of a centralized system without ceding power to the 
federal government.
239
  As David Barron has noted, there is a need to 
“acknowledge the more complicated relationship between local autonomy 
and central power.”240 
A similar phenomenon can be said to exist with respect to the siting of 
electricity.  It is unclear that state control better advances federalist values 
for electricity generation and that federal control best advances federalism 
values in the other siting regimes.  For example, it is uncertain that a state 
and local governments are better positioned to protect their citizens’ health, 
safety, and welfare.
241
  For instance, repeated decisions by PUCs to site 
additional coal plants in lieu of renewable energies or demand response 
measures can have detrimental impacts on the amount of GHG emissions, 
other pollutants, and other full life-cycle environmental and health effects.  
West Virginia legislators, for example, are uniformly in favor of retaining 
coal as a dominant energy source and the state relies on coal for over 96% 
of its power needs.
242
  Such a decision may be justified on the basis of 
protecting their citizens’ welfare, arguing that reliance on coal provides 
local jobs, enhances the tax base, and otherwise helps the local economy.  
Yet, at least two reports on coal-dependent West Virginia and Kentucky 
demonstrate that coal production is a net loss to the states due to the high 
                                                                                                                          
Towns Stand Ground over Control, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, at A20 (highlighting the debate 
between local and state governments over the regulation of fracking shale deposits to access natural 
gas). 
239 See Friedman, supra note 25, at 409; see also, Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Wasted Days and 
Wasted Nights: Why the Land Acts Failed, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1037, 1040 (1996) (stating that in 1896, 
every state adopted the Uniform Negotiable Instruments law, developed by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws); Norman Silber, Why the U.C.C. Should Not Subordinate Itself 
to Federal Authority: Imperfect Uniformity, Improper Delegation and Revised Section 3-102(c), 55 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 441, 456 (1994) (stating that states also achieved a “rough” uniformity under the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) by each adopting its own version, subject to continuing state legislative 
modification and judicial interpretation).  But see Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the 
Boundaries: The Scope of Congress's Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 849, 
886 (2002) (arguing state tort law allows a single state to set national standards in violation of the 
commerce clause). 
240 David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 381 (2001).  
Barron argues that “a single-minded desire to protect local autonomy by limiting central power actually 
may do little to promote the values normally associated with local autonomy.”  Id. at 379. 
241 See Daniel  J. Weiss et al., Dirty Deeds Done Dirt Cheap, CTR FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 6, 
2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/csapr_contributions.html/print.html (stating 
that sixteen states are suing to halt implementation of the EPA’s interstate air pollution rule that seeks 
to protect downwind states from upwind emitters and that those sixteen states are responsible for more 
than ninety percent of the nation’s total sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide air pollution from power 
plants that these laws are trying to reduce).   
242 Where Does Your Electricity Come From?: West Virginia, AMERICA’SPOWER.ORG, 
http://www.cleancoalusa.org/abundant/where-does-your-electricity-come (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
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costs of coal-related health impacts.
243
   
In the end, the federalism virtues fail to fully explain the disparity 
between the siting of electricity and other siting regimes. 
B.  Siting of Electricity Generation is Traditionally Local   
Another possible explanation for disparity between the siting regimes 
is that siting authority for electricity generation remains with the state and 
local authorities because these decisions are uniquely of a “traditionally” 
local nature.  As Professor William W. Buzbee has indicated, land use 
decision making remains one of the few areas of the law left 
overwhelmingly to state and local control, and some Supreme Court 
jurisprudence demonstrates a judicial reluctance to intrude upon this 
area.
244
  The land use context is particularly prone to resolving federalism 
discussions in favor of the state given the inherently local nature of land 
use.  Professors Ashira Ostrow and Uma Outka have recently focused on 
the crossroads of energy infrastructure siting and local land use law, with 
Professor Ostrow noting that despite the national impact that local siting 
decisions may have “scholars and policymakers often reject the notion of 
an expanded federal role.”245   
Nevertheless, the literature highlights a number of areas thought to be 
traditionally under “local control” that have tipped to enhanced federal 
control.  Professor Buzbee notes that “federal environmental regulation can 
impinge on local and state land use regulatory choices by denying actions 
that might otherwise be allowed, or by imposing additional conditions on 
approvals.”246  Federal programs, grants, and initiatives increasingly 
encroach on traditionally “essential functions” of state governance such as 
health and family law.
247
  For example, state control over family law has 
been usurped by federal concern over interstate child support, concerns 
over international human rights, and even with the administration of 
                                                                                                                          
243 RORY MCILMOIL ET AL.,  COAL AND RENEWABLES IN CENTRAL APPALACHIA: THE IMPACT OF 
COAL ON THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE BUDGET x–xiv (2010), available at 
http://www.downstreamstrategies.com/documents/reports_publication/DownstreamStrategies-
coalWV.pdf ); MOUNTAIN ASS’N FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV., THE IMPACT OF COAL ON THE KENTUCKY 
STATE BUDGET 1, 2 (2009), available at http://www.maced.org/coal/exe-summary.htm. 
244 See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173–
74 (2001) (expressing concern that expanding federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats under 
Migratory Bird Rule would impinge significantly on traditional state power over land and water use); 
William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1560 (2007) (stating that state and local governments traditionally regulate land 
use).  
245  Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1400; Uma Outka, supra 
note 165, at 309 (arguing that federalism norms about local control over land use are too entrenched to 
offer much hope for structural reform). 
246 Buzbee, supra note 244, at 1560. 
247 James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 
309, 336 (1998). 
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federal taxes and pensions.
248
  Therefore, traditional classification of cases 
into “family law,” “interstate travel,” “foreign affairs,” or “governmental 
administration” has become nearly impossible.249  
In the area of health and environmental law, the federal government 
now regulates “air and water quality, food and drug safety, tobacco 
advertising, pesticide production and sales, consumer product safety, 
occupational health and safety, and medical care.”250  As the states’ police 
power is usurped by the federal government’s commerce and spending 
powers, the modern public health system is now “driven by national 
priorities in the pursuit of national health goals.”251  In the environmental 
realm, courts have consistently upheld federal authority to promulgate 
policies impacting areas traditionally controlled by the states.
252
  For 
example, courts upheld the constitutionality of the Clean Air Act, Clean 
Water Act, Endangered Species Act and Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act because these federal laws 
explicitly regulated industrial or commercial activity.
253
  In short, 
traditionally local activities are not immune from federal intervention. 
Similarly, the siting of all of the infrastructure discussed in this 
Article—railroads, natural gas, telecommunications, and electricity—were 
considered traditionally local activities that carried with them a 
presumption of decentralized control.
254
  Nevertheless, for almost all of 
these siting regimes, this traditionally local nature of siting did not prevent 
the tip towards more federal involvement.  The siting of electricity 
generation remains an exception despite the fact that its “traditionally” 
local roots are shared by all the siting regimes.  Just as the traditionally 
local nature of these other siting regimes was not sufficient to withstand a 
                                                                                                                          
248 Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 106 (2004). 
249 Id. 
250 Hodge, supra note 247, at 336. 
251 Id. at 338. 
252 See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 405 (2005) (noting that, “[t]hus far, federal appellate courts have 
uniformly rejected Commerce Clause challenges to the scope of federal environmental regulation”). 
253 Id. 
254 Ostrow, supra note 190, at 295–96 (citing the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–87 (1926), which led to states and local governments 
to regulate the fields of zoning and land use and upheld local zoning practices in recognition of rapid 
development of urban populations and the need to regulate land use to accommodate competing 
interests).  When Congress was in the process of passing the Transportation Act of 1920 to tip towards 
federal control over railroads, New York Governor Smith voiced vehement opposition to the bill as a 
violation of states’ rights.  Says Railroad Bills Violate State Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1920, at 34.  
In the electricity generation context, Professor Outka has analyzed some of the early power plant siting 
statutes, noting the siting decisions were in the hands of local governments.  See Outka, supra note 165, 
at 309.  When the EPAct of 2005 was proposed, those opposed to it claimed that the power to site LNG 
terminals was within the traditional authority of states to determine land use patterns and ensure citizen 
safety.  Scott A. Zimmermann, Comment, Feds and Fossils: Meaningful State Participation in the 
Development of Liquefied Natural Gas, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 789, 791–92 (2006).  
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tip towards federal control, the siting of electricity generation may be 
similarly vulnerable.  At the very least, its traditionally local nature is not 
sufficient to explain why authority over the siting of electricity generation 
remains under state control.   
C.  Self-Interested Legislators Prefer State Control over the Siting of 
 Electricity Generation 
A final explanation for the lack of a federal tip is politics.
255
  Some 
argue that determining when market correction is needed or when social 
costs should be internalized are complex issues largely resolved through 
the political process.
256
  Indeed, lobbyists have extensive influence over the 
actions of legislators.  One theory that captures the essence of legislators 
who are driven by strong lobbyists is public choice theory.  Some have 
relied on public choice theory to suggest that “Congress will delegate to 
local regulators only when the political support it obtains from deferring to 
the states is greater than the political support it obtains from regulating 
itself.”257  Although this theory has some intuitive appeal, its limits lie in 
comparative analyses.  This section explains the basic foundations of 
public choice theory, some generally applicable critiques, and why it has 
limited application to explain why the legal regime over the siting of 
electricity has remained under state control.  
1.  Public Choice Theory 
Public choice is one of those terms that is used often, but rarely 
understood.
258
  Although there are many dimensions to public choice 
theory, including social impact, “[t]he unifying thread of modern public 
choice theory is that ‘[w]e must always seek to understand political 
outcomes as a function of self-interested individual behaviors.’”259  It 
                                                                                                                          
255 ANTHONY J. BELLIA, JR., FEDERALISM 214 (2010) (“Political factors often dictate wholesale 
federal legislative reliance on state regulation and implementation.”).  Some suggest that FERC’s 
moves towards federal control over the siting of transmission lines is driven by former FERC 
Commissioner Kelliher’s new position working for NextEra Energy, a company that needs more 
transmission lines to bring its power to market.  See FERC’s Transmission Siting Federalism Coup, 
STOPPATH WV BLOG (Aug. 27, 2011), http://www.stoppathwv.com/1/post/2011/08/fercs-
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256 Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act: Why 
We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1260 (1995). 
257 Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of 
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 267 (1990). 
258 See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 1029, 1031 (2011) (reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE 
CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009)) (observing that more than sixty years after its initial use 
by Duncan Black and Kenneth Arrow circa 1950, “legal academics oftentimes do not understand public 
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259 Jim Rossi, Public Choice Theory and the Fragmented Web of the Contemporary 
Administrative State, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1746, 1752 (1998) (citations omitted) (reviewing JERRY L. 
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views the political sphere as “a market in which voters and representatives, 
like consumers and firms, act as if they are rational, maximizing 
individuals pursuing their self-interests.”260  Public choice theory “defines 
the legislative process as an arena for fundamentally self-serving behavior 
as legislators trade off votes on specific legislation to advance their 
prospects for reelection.”261  It applies the “rational actor model of 
economic theory to the realm of politics,” and leads to the conclusion that 
systems need to be created that automatically restrain the self-serving 
behavior of “rent-seeking” politicians.262  After all, politicians would not 
be politicians for very long if they did not care about electability. 
An application of public choice theory to legislators resonates with 
many people.  A premise that people act as rational wealth-maximizers 
(however wealth may be defined), has been expounded by many 
economists, most predominantly Judge Richard Posner.
263
  A growing 
number of scholars across economics, political science, and law have 
explored the viability of public choice theory.  The result is an extensive 
amount of empirical data that appears to support the general theory that 
individuals act in accordance with their own self-interest.  Empirical proof 
has even been offered to support the allegation that self-interest drives 
legislators the same way as it drives individuals in a market.
264
   
2.  Explanatory Limits of Public Choice 
Public choice theory also has its share of critics.  Some argue that the 
theory is too simple, that the values each individual actor considers when 
making a choice are too varied for the actor himself to rank, let alone for 
outsiders to predict.
265
   Others find public choice theory lacking when 
describing the activities of political parties as a whole, and they find 
unsatisfying the distillation of myriad perspectives and values into one 
                                                                                                                          
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997)).  
260 Id. 
261 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 650 (1998). 
262 William F. Shughart II, Public Choice, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoice.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012). 
263 E.g., Richard A. Posner, On Theory and Practice: Reply to “Richard Posner’s Praxis”, 49 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1077, 1078 (1989) (defending his views on a wealth maximizing society). 
264 Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice in Practice and Theory, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1657, 1658–59 
(1993) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991) (“Farber 
and Frickey affirm the behavioral assumptions of the public choice vision, rejecting the romantic notion 
often proposed by civil republicans that both voters and legislators are, or can be, motivated by public 
spirit rather than self-interest, and that they can effectuate their desires through rational discourse rather 
than strategic, self-maximizing behavior.”).  
265 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social 
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2142 (1990) 
(“Rationality must be understood to be a matter of interpretation and evaluation, not merely of 
aggregation and calculation.”). 
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hierarchy of values.
266
  And still its view of people—both acting as 
individuals and in a legislative capacity—has been criticized as “ruthless” 
and “wealth-maximizing,”267 as too unfair (people are capable of 
altruism),
268
 and as too generous (people are not always rational or 
educated, and thus do not always act in ways that maximize their own 
wealth).
269
  An example of this type of altruism can be found in 
environmental regulation.  Professor Richard Stewart observes that “many 
Americans regard environmental quality as an important national good that 
transcends individual or local interests.”270  Congress reacted to strong 
public sentiment by passing the National Environmental Policy Act.
271
  
The Act was not a result of special interest lobbying, and its continued 
existence “may provide evidence of the continued broad-based support for 
environmental protection as a national moral imperative.”272  The demand 
for environmental regulation “tends to increase over time as wealth, 
technical capability, scientific knowledge, and environmental impacts 
increase.”273 
Similar limitations exist in the usefulness of public choice theory to 
explain the disparity of control between the siting of electricity generation 
and other infrastructure siting regimes.  Despite a number of justifications 
for centralized control similar to the other siting regimes, one could argue 
that control over electricity siting continues to rest with the states due to 
legislators that are not keen on rocking the boat with their respective state 
contingencies.  Shifting power that has remained with the state for over 
seventy years is bound to deplete some of their political capital—a form of 
                                                                                                                          
266 Samuel Issacharoff & Laura Miller, Democracy and Electoral Processes 14 (N.Y.U. School of 
Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-16, 2010), available at 
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267 Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical” 
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270 Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 244 (2000) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
271 See id. at 244 (arguing that the National Environmental Policy Act was not the result of special 
interest lobbying but widespread public support). 
272 Id.  But see Adler, supra note 33, at 72 (attributing the passage of environmental law to 
“‘strong public demand, coupled with exploitation of that demand by ideological and credit-seeking 
politicians’” (quoting Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 59, 61 (1992))). 
273 Adler, supra note 33, at 98–99. 
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wealth they may be seeking to maximize—and even risk their electability, 
and hence another wealth index.  But could not the same be said of the 
other siting regimes?   
Although public choice provides some valuable insights, it is hard to 
provide specific information in any particular moment.  And although the 
legitimacy of public choice theory as one possible explanation for behavior 
has been largely accepted, the foundations upon which it rests make it 
difficult to use as a comparative tool.  First, the effects of self-interested 
actions apply to all legislators, rendering it difficult to isolate specific 
interests that resulted in continued state control over electricity generation 
from specific interests that resulted in tips towards federal control for the 
other siting regimes.  As Professor David Skeel notes, some criticize public 
choice theory as excessively malleable, “lending itself to any conclusion a 
commentator wishes to reach.”274  Although it is plausible to suggest that 
the siting of electricity generation has remained under state control because 
rational legislators find that to be in their own self-interest, it is difficult to 
empirically demonstrate that this same self-interest led similarly situated 
rational legislators to tip towards federal control in all the other siting 
regimes. 
Second, assuming that all legislators act in their own self-interest 
provides no consistent correlation to either state or federal power.  For 
instance, where self-interested legislators are reluctant to act in a manner 
that jeopardizes their reelection, their actions may be more aligned with the 
protection of state sovereignty and decentralized state authority.  But for 
legislators that are not in an election year, their self-interest may lead them 
in different directions.  Those legislators may be more focused on 
obtaining necessary votes from their fellow legislators to accomplish goals, 
making them more reluctant to act in a manner that jeopardizes those votes 
for their pet projects.  Their pet projects, or those of their fellow legislators, 
may be more aligned with national security, climate change, or other 
issues, suggesting an increased role for the federal government over 
electricity siting.  As Professor Daniel Sokol notes, “An overly broad 
generalization about rationality has its limits.
 
 If self-interest can mean just 
about anything, then it is not constraining the analysis.”275  Along similar 
lines, self-interests do not lead legislators to act in a linear fashion that 
always points towards state control.       
In sum, the prevailing theories for explaining the discrepancy between 
state control over electricity generation siting and enhanced federal control 
over the other siting regimes are unsatisfying.  All of the siting regimes 
                                                                                                                          
274 David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal 
Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647, 669 (1997) (reviewing MAXWELL STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND 
PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997)). 
275 Sokol, supra note 258, at 1040 (citation omitted). 
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were traditionally local, the federalism virtues fail to conclusively point 
towards either state or federal authority for the different regimes, and a 
focus on self-interested legislators fails to correlate to one particular level 
of authority.  Upon closer examination, any overarching account of these 
tips breaks down and becomes nuanced and contingent on the specifics of a 
dynamic and complicated balance.  
VI.  ALTERNATIVE OUTLETS FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT 
If these theories do not fully explain the disparity in control between 
the siting of electricity generation and the siting of the other infrastructure, 
then what else can be weighing in favor of state control?  Something must 
be serving as a counterbalance against the justifications for centralized 
control.  One often overlooked answer is the presence of an alternative 
outlet for federal involvement.   
This analysis thus far has focused on statutory tips that occur as a 
result of federal legislative action.  As previously discussed, developing 
national interests in an area that is governed by state or local control can 
create a tension in the proper functioning of the power structure.
276
  This 
tension can be resolved through statutory adjustments.  But it can also be 
resolved through agency action.  The ability of a federal agency to step in 
and address the national interest on the margins can create a release valve 
to reduce the pressure on Congress to act formally to tip the balance of 
power.  Congress is less likely to find the need to endure the political costs 
associated with amending a statute, let alone a politically charged 
federalism provision of a statute, when the federal government is able to 
accomplish some of its federal objectives without necessitating a formal 
amendment. 
This phenomenon plays out in the siting analysis.  In the earlier siting 
regime tips, agency action does not appear to have played a critical role in 
diffusing the tensions caused by growing federal interests.  There is little 
evidence that either the ICC or the FPC were issuing regulations that 
expressed a federal interest in ensuring the railroads and natural gas lines 
were being built prior to their respective congressional tips.  On the 
contrary, in both the telecommunications and transmission lines siting 
regimes, the respective agencies, FCC
277
 and FERC,
278
 made some sort of 
                                                                                                                          
276 Proper functioning in this instance refers to a balance of power that furthers the values of our 
federalism system. 
277 See, e.g., Facilitating Access to Federal Property for the Siting of Mobile Services Antennas, 
60 Fed. Reg. 42,023 (Aug. 14, 1995) (requiring agency administrators to develop procedures for the 
siting of mobile service antennas on federal lands); Wireless Service; General Wireless 
Communications Service, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,712, 40,713 (Aug. 9, 1995) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 
1, 26) (showing FCC’s use of its broad authority under the Communications Act of 1934 to issue 
wireless regulations that promoted the growth of the then-nascent wireless industry by reallocating 
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effort to address national interests prior to the statutory tips.  Is it a 
coincidence that these are the two areas where the congressional tip 
consisted not of complete preemption, but a more limited form of federal 
control through a partial preemption?  This may be in part because of the 
active involvement of the FCC and FERC to try to address some of these 
federal issues on the margins.
279
  Their limited success may have mitigated 
the need for a full preemption on these matters.  Had the federal agencies 
not been making strides in furtherance of the national interest, Congress 
may have had more motivation to enact tips towards stronger federal 
control.   
Similarly, with respect to the siting of electricity generation, an active 
administrative agency may be minimizing the incentives of Congress to 
formally tip the balance of power from state towards more federal control.  
Federal agencies may be better able to address the national interest in 
electricity siting because of the nature of the federal interest.  Rather than a 
federal interest limited to making sure the infrastructure is ultimately sited, 
for instance, the federal interest in the siting of electricity generation 
extends to the type of infrastructure being sited (electricity generation 
based on renewable or coal, for instance), and perhaps more importantly, 
an interest in the type of fuel source relied upon by each new electric-
generating facility.
280
  Where the federal interest is limited to making sure 
the new infrastructure is constructed, as it was in so many of the other 
infrastructure regimes, the federal government has few options by which to 
                                                                                                                          
spectrum from the federal government to public use.).  The FCC created the General Wireless 
Communications Service for the purpose of “benefit[ing] the public by permitting and encouraging the 
introduction of new services and the enhancement of existing services” leading to job creation, 
economic growth and improved access to communications.  Id. at 40,712. 
278 See, e.g., Removing Obstacles to Increased Electric Generation and Natural Gas Supply in the 
Western United States, 66 Fed. Reg. 15,858, 15,860 (Mar. 21, 2001) (discussing agency action to 
increase energy supply and protect consumers from supply disruptions).  Recognizing the need for 
additional transmission lines to be constructed, but understanding its jurisdictional limitations, FERC 
tried to influence the siting of transmission lines through traditional carrot and stick techniques:  
In order to provide incentives for the construction of such projects at the earliest date 
possible, we propose to give transmission owners of projects that increase 
transmission capacity at present constraints and can be in service by July 1, 2001, a 
cost–based rate reflecting a 300 basis point premium on equity and a 10–year 
depreciable life. 
Id. at 15,860.  FERC also used its broad authority under the Federal Power Act to propose regulations 
to facilitate the construction of transmission lines by eliminating discriminatory transmission tariffs.  
See, e.g., Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and Standard 
Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452  (Aug. 29, 2002) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
279 See supra notes 277–78. 
280 This is not to minimize the federal interest in ensuring that electricity generators are ultimately 
sited.  Surely, the federal government has an interest in ensuring that the nation has a reliable and 
affordable supply of electricity, but compared to the other siting regimes, the federal interests in 
electricity siting are even broader to include type.  
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directly influence a state or local decision in lieu of a formal congressional 
tip.  But where the federal interest is in the type of the facility, the federal 
government has more options available to influence the type of facility 
constructed.  Where the relevant federal agencies can address the national 
interest they had in siting (the type of resources used to generate 
electricity) through other means, it may provide an important 
counterbalance to the justifications for centralized control.  
This section describes the efforts of three federal agencies to find 
alternative outlets to influence the type of electricity produced within each 
state: (1) FERC; (2) EPA; and (3) Department of Interior (DOI).  All three 
have been acting within their existing statutory authorities to address the 
issues of current federal interest: enhanced reliance on renewables and 
other clean energy sources.  I argue that these efforts are minimizing the 
strain on the existing electricity regime, providing a critical release valve 
on the federalism tensions.  This highlights an important additional factor 
that may counter any federalism justifications for a formal congressional 
tip towards federal control.  
A.  FERC’s Outlet on Renewables  
The first example of an outlet for a growing federal interest in cleaner 
energy sources lies with FERC.  FERC, an agency not traditionally known 
for its environmental values, has taken steps to advance the national 
interest in renewable energy.  FERC’s mission has been to assist 
consumers in “obtaining reliable, efficient and sustainable energy services 
at a reasonable cost through appropriate regulatory and market means.”281  
But with carbon-laden fossil fuels providing 88% of the nation’s 
electricity
282
 and 79% of the nation’s greenhouse gases,283 FERC’s 
attention has begun to shift towards climate change and renewable energy, 
echoing the Obama Administration’s emphasis on clean energy as a 
national priority: 
The use of renewable energy resources to generate electricity 
has the potential to be a cost-effective means not only to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but also to diversify the 
                                                                                                                          
281 Strategic Plan FY 2009–FY 2013, FERC (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.ferc.gov/about/strat-
docs/strat-plan.asp. 
282 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2009 2 (2011), available at  
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/03482009.pdf. 
283 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND 
SINKS: 1990–2010 ES-7 (2012), available at  
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf 
(“As the largest source of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 from fossil fuel combustion has 
accounted for approximately 78 percent of GWP-weighted emissions since 1990, growing slowly from 
77 percent of total GWP-weighted emissions in 1990 to 79 percent in 2010.  Emissions of CO2 from 
fossil fuel combustion increased at an average annual rate of 0.4 percent from 1990 to 2010.”).   
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fuels used to generate electricity.  The Commission will 
continue to pursue market reforms to allow all resources, 
including renewable energy resources, to compete in 
jurisdictional markets on a level playing field. . . .  By 
implementing these or other reforms, the Commission’s 
actions have the potential to increase the amount of 
electricity being produced from renewable energy 
resources.
284
   
FERC did not stop with sweeping statements about its efforts to 
enhance our nation’s reliance on renewable energy.  FERC has also 
injected itself into the state and local electricity generation siting decisions 
in a number of ways.
285
  An important method involves using FERC’s 
broad authority under the FPA to review rates and charges to ensure that 
they are “just and reasonable” and not “unduly discriminatory.”286  Relying 
on its broad authority under these provisions, the agency also issued two 
recent rulemakings that seek to enable more renewable energy generation 
in this country.  In July 2011, FERC issued Order 1000, the “Final Rule on 
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and 
Operating Public Utilities” that resulted in significant changes related to 
the construction of transmission lines in a way that allows “for reliably and 
cost-effectively integrating location-constrained renewable energy 
resources.” 287   Whereas transmission line planners previously evaluated 
proposed transmission lines based on only two benefits—reliability and 
economics—FERC’s new Order 1000 requires that each public utility 
transmission provider also provide for the consideration of “Public Policy 
requirements established by state or federal laws or regulations.”288  Not 
only does FERC specifically call out “the renewable portfolio standards 
                                                                                                                          
284 Integration of Renewables, FERC (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/integration-renew.asp; see also James H. McGrew, 
FERC’s Green Agenda, TRENDS, Mar./Apr. 2010, at 1. 
285 Other FERC regulations have eliminated other barriers to the integration of renewable 
resources onto the grid, including  FERC Order 2005, Standardization of Small Generator 
Interconnection Agreements & Procedures, (May 12, 2005), available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20050512110357-order2006.pdf, and FERC Order 2003, 
Interconnection for Wind Energy, Order No. 661, Appendix G to Order 2003, (June 2, 2005), available 
at http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/052505/E-1.pdf. 
286 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a).  Section 824e provides that if FERC finds any “rate, charge, or 
classification” or any “rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification 
is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just 
and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter 
observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order.”  Id.   
287 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Final Rule on Transmission Planning and Cost 
Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 at 66 (July 21, 
2011), available at http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2011/072111/E-6.pdf.   
288 Id. at 9. 
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adopted by many states”289 as an example of such “Public Policy 
requirements,” but the term is broad enough to encompass a large range of 
federal interests that can include environmental priorities.  Again, FERC 
based the issuance on this order on its jurisdiction under Section 206 of the 
FPA to “ensure that the rates, terms and conditions of service provided by 
public utility transmission providers are just and reasonable and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential.”290   
More recently, in June of 2012, FERC issued a second relevant 
renewable energy rulemaking.  FERC issued a final rule as a means of 
removing barriers to the integration of renewable energy, which it termed 
“variable energy resources.”291  Renewable resources present a unique 
challenge for grid operators and suppliers due to their intermittent nature.  
FERC found that the existing rules have the potential to discriminate 
against renewable energy generators, triggering FERC’s duty to prevent 
“unjust or preferential rates.”292  In a statement about the proposed 
rulemaking, FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff stated that it “will help to 
manage the cost-effective integration of variable energy resources into the 
grid and to meet the future’s other challenges in a way that maintains 
reliability.”293  Chairman Wellinghoff has stated:   
Quite frankly, FERC is sort of operating independently of the 
electoral process. . . . We’ve been acting under our statutory 
federal authority to move forward toward what I see as our 
responsibilities under the Federal Power Act, and that is to 
ensure rates are just and reasonable. And part of that I see as 
improving efficiency and competition in the markets, and 
incorporating new resources into the markets, including 
                                                                                                                          
289 Id. at 66.  Renewable portfolio standards are state mandates that requires utilities to obtain 
a specified percentage of their electricity from renewable energy sources. 
290 Id. at 7. 
291 Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,482, 41,515 (July 13, 2010) (to 
be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (stating that FERC seeks to define a VER as “a device for the 
production of electricity that is characterized by an energy source that: (1) is renewable; (2) cannot 
be stored by the facility owner or operator; and (3) has variability that is beyond the control of the 
facility owner or operator”).  The rule adopts two reforms from a November 2010 Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) by requiring transmission providers to offer customers the option of 
scheduling transmission service at fifteen-minute intervals and by requiring generators using 
variable energy resources to provide transmission owners with certain data to support power 
production forecasting. 
292 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2006).  
293 FERC, Statement of Chairman Wellinghoff on Integration of Variable Energy Resources 
NOPR (Nov. 18, 2010), available at  
http://www.ferc.gov/media/statements-speeches/wellinghoff/2010/11-18-10-wellinghoff-E-1.asp.  
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renewables and the demand side.
294
 
B.  EPA’s Outlet on Pollution Control Limits 
The second outlet for federal influence over the type of power 
generated is EPA’s recent regulations regarding GHGs.  A 2007 Supreme 
Court decision affirming the ability of EPA to regulate GHGs under the 
Clean Air Act
295
 set the course for a new era of Clean Air Act regulations 
specific to GHGs.  Over the last five years, EPA has been feeling its way 
through this unchartered territory, starting with key regulatory findings that 
GHGs endanger the public welfare with respect to mobile sources,
296
 
continuing with reporting regulations,
297
 specially tailoring existing 
regulations for new source controls to account for the unique character of 
GHGs,
298
 tightening fuel efficiency standards for the first time in 30 
years,
299
 and most recently, proposing New Source Performance Standards 
for all fossil-fuel boilers.
300
 
This most recent proposal may be the most indicative of EPA’s ability 
to exert its influence over the type of electricity generated.  EPA is 
required to establish emissions standards for industrial categories.
301
  It 
defined the industrial category as “fossil-fuel-fired boilers,” and 
determined that all fossil-fuel burning plants (whether they be coal, natural 
gas, or oil) must meet the emissions standard established by combined 
cycle natural gas plants.
302
  This effectively mandates that all new fossil-
fuel (i.e., nonrenewable) plants that will be constructed must be natural 
gas, resulting in a potential phase-out of coal and oil plants.
303
  Although 
                                                                                                                          
294 Peter Behr, FERC Moves Ahead with Campaign To Promote Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/11/12/12clim
atewire-ferc-moves-ahead-with-campaign-to-promote-en-22696.html?pagewanted=all. 
295 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007); see also Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. 
EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (rejecting challenges to EPA’s greenhouse gas 
regulations). 
296 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) 
of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
297 Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 87, 90, 94, 98, 1033, 1039, 1042, 1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1065). 
298 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). 
299 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600). 
300 Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (Apr. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
60). 
301 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2006). 
302 Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (Apr. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
60). 
303 EPA acknowledges that coal plants could satisfy the new standards with the installation of 
carbon capture and sequestration, a largely unproven technology on a commercial scale.  Id. 
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not specifically mandating renewable energy, it reduces the likelihood that 
state PUCs will approve applications to construct new coal or oil power 
plants within their state borders.   
C.  Department of Interior’s Outlet on Federal Lands 
The third outlet for federal agency influence over the type of power 
generated is through the siting of renewable energy on federal lands.  The 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 encourages agencies to site renewable energy 
projects on federal lands
304
 and subsequent executive orders added more 
teeth to this encouragement.
305
  As I have described elsewhere, the DOI, 
the agency that manages millions of acres of federal land in the United 
States, has taken many steps to implement these orders by fast-tracking 
siting of solar and wind projects on federal lands both onshore and 
offshore.
306
  As a result, over nine solar and twenty-five wind projects have 
been approved in recent years,
307
 with many more applications in the 
pipeline.
308
      
In summary, although politics, special interests, moral commitments, 
federalism justifications, and a host of other factors contribute to these 
decisions, continued state control over the siting of electricity generation 
may be at least partially explained by the additional underappreciated 
variable of the availability of alternative outlets for federal control.  This 
analysis suggests that even though there is an emerging national interest in 
the source of our electricity and some federalism justifications for more 
centralized authority, an active administrative agency is able to effect some 
of that national purpose on the margins through regulation. 
It should be noted that such agency actions have the potential to 
backfire.  Agency actions that affect the balance of power between the 
                                                                                                                          
304 See Federal Energy Management Program, Energy Policy Act of 2005, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/regulations/epact2005.html#rer (last visited  July 1, 2012) 
(requiring that the federal government source increasing amounts of its electricity use from renewables 
but granting a “double credit bonus for Federal agencies if renewable electricity is produced on-site at a 
Federal facility, on Federal lands, or on Native American lands”). 
305 Exec. Order 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3,919 (Jan. 26, 2007); Federal Energy Management 
Program, Executive Order 13,423 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/regulations/eo13423.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).  “By using 
renewable energy, Federal agencies increase national security, conserve natural resources, and meet 
regulatory requirements and goals.”   Federal Energy Management Program, Renewable Energy, U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/technologies/renewable_energy.html (last 
visited Aug. 13, 2012). 
306 See Amy Stein, Renewable Energy Through Agency Action, COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013).  
307 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S.D.A., NEW ENERGY FRONTIER: BALANCING ENERGY 
DEVELOPMENT ON FEDERAL LANDS 14, 17 (2011), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/whatwedo/energy/upload/NewEnergyFrontier050511.pdf. 
308 Id. at 17. 
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states and federal government have been under scrutiny for some time.
309
  
Despite mandates from the Executive Branch to carefully consider the 
impacts on federalism prior to rulemaking, studies have revealed agency 
failures to comply.
310
  In fact, the Administrative Conference of the United 
States recently recommended a number of procedures to better ensure 
agency compliance with Executive Orders mandating that the agencies 
ensure proper respect for federalism.
311
  As Professor Robert Percival has 
noted, “history also demonstrates that efforts to achieve federal goals will 
be thwarted if they are pursued without sensitivity to state and local 
concerns.”312 
Furthermore, greater federal involvement in renewables is dependent 
on the political preferences of the federal government at the time.  As one 
scholar observed: 
The political valences of national power and state autonomy 
constantly have shifted back and forth throughout our 
history.  In the Progressive Era, liberals were often based in 
the states and distrusted federal (particularly federal judicial) 
power; in the 1960s and 1970s, the opposite was more often 
true.  Prior to the Civil War, slaveholders relied on federal 
authority to recover escaped slaves, while more enlightened 
state governments in the North sought to preserve some 
modicum of due process for accused escapees.  It is an 
ahistorical mistake to take the particular political patterns of 
the last third of a century for immutable structural truth.  One 
simply cannot ascribe a reliable political tendency to 
federalism.
313
 
In much the same way, it would be a mistake to assume that federal 
agency actions with regard to electricity generation siting would 
necessarily result in the promotion of renewable energy.  Just as the 
political valences of national power and state autonomy flip-flopped over 
time, the results of active federal agencies would likely flip-flop with the 
political parties in control of the various branches.  Some have even argued 
that national efforts to enhance renewables can have unintended negative 
                                                                                                                          
309 Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987);  Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000); 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 2010-1: AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERING PREEMPTION OF STATE 
LAW 1 (2010), available at http://www.acus.gov/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2011/06/Recommendation-2010-1-Preemption.pdf [hereinafter 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION]. 
310 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 309, at 3. 
311 Id. 
312 Percival, supra note 43, at 1180. 
313 Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake 
of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1307–08 (2004) (citations omitted). 
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consequences.
314
  One such consequence could be an increased reliance on 
cheaper fossil fuels to offset the more expensive renewables that might be 
required by federal mandates. 
VII.  CONTINUING PRESSURES ON THE PROPER BALANCE IN SITING 
REGIMES 
Discussions about the proper balance of power in siting and other areas 
of the law are sure to continue.  In the two areas where Congress took 
small steps towards preemption or federalization, telecommunications and 
electricity transmission, for instance, movements to enhance federal 
control continue.  In 2009, the FCC issued a “Shot Clock” Rule 315 that 
further forced the hand of the local authorities to approve requests for 
tower siting more swiftly.
316
  And in April 2011, the FCC reopened issues 
surrounding the proper balance of power over siting of wireless 
infrastructure.  The FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry that it “intended to 
update [the FCC’s] understanding of current rights of way and wireless 
facilities siting policies.”317  The FCC viewed the Inquiry as “a necessary 
step towards determining whether there is a need for coordinated national 
action to improve rights of way and wireless facilities siting policies, and if 
so, what role the Commission should play in conjunction with other 
stakeholders.”318  Not surprisingly, local organizations spoke out against 
the expansion of the FCC’s authority over broadband and wireless 
facilities
319
 while members of the telecommunications industry fully 
                                                                                                                          
314 See Robert J. Michaels, National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy or 
Misguided Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 79, 88 (2008) (arguing that a national RPS would not result 
in a net increase in employment as some have predicted because “[l]abor is [simply] reallocated to 
renewables” and workers “are paid with funds that households and businesses would have spent 
elsewhere”). 
315 FCC Establishes Shot Clock for Tower Siting Applications, GA. MUN. ASS’N (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.gmanet.com/MDR.aspx?CNID=45651. 
316 Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (amending Communications Act of 1934, 
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)).  This declaratory ruling clarified the TCA’s general directive to local zoning 
authorities to act “within a reasonable time” on requests for tower siting by establishing deadlines of 90 
and 150 days for review of applications for wireless communication facilities including collocations 
and tower siting applications.  Failure to act after these deadlines opens the door for legal action by the 
applicant against the local zoning authority.  47 U.S.C. § 332.   
317 FCC Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 11-59, 5384, 5388 (Apr. 7, 2011), 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-51A1_Rcd.pdf. 
318 Id. at 5388; see also Acceleration of Broadband Deployment by Improving Policies Regarding 
Public Rights of Way and Wireless Facilities Siting, 76 Fed. Reg. 28,397 (May 17, 2011) (to be 
codified at 47 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
319 See PIEDMONT ENVTL. COUNCIL, COMMENTS ON THE FCC NOTICE OF INQUIRY REGARDING 
ACCESS TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS-OF-WAY 1 (2011), available at 
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs//document/view.action?id=7021692588 (questioning the FCC’s substitution of 
“zoning decisions, which are discretionary acts” with “right-of-way permits, which are ministerially 
granted”); see also Member Alert: Comments Due Sept. 30 on FCC Wireless Facility Siting Policy, 
ASS’N OF CAL. WATER AGENCIES, http://acwa.symsoftsolutions.com/content/federal-relations/member-
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supported the government’s attempt to deploy broadband on a larger 
scale.
320
   
On the electricity transmission side, the courts have significantly 
limited FERC’s backstop authority.321  In response, FERC indicated a “do 
it alone” attitude where it indicated that it was going to seek a delegation of 
authority from DOE to FERC to avoid having to engage in the legislative 
process.
322
  For now, DOE rejected FERC’s proposal to consolidate 
authority.
323
  Additionally, the DOI has made several efforts to expedite the 
siting of transmission lines.
324
  The National Commission on Energy Policy 
observed in 2006 that “energy-facility siting and permitting remains a 
major cross-cutting challenge for U.S. energy policy” and cited “processes 
in which local concerns trump broader regional or national objectives” as 
an obstacle to permitting and building major facilities where they are 
needed most.
325
  If interstate controversies become more commonplace, the 
                                                                                                                          
alert-comments-due-sept-30-fcc-wireless-facility-siting-policy (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (disagreeing 
with the wireless communications industry’s portrayal of local governments as an obstacle to expansion 
of broadband services).   
320 Reply Comments of the National Telecommunications Cooperative Association at 2, In re 
Acceleration of Broadband Deployment: Expanding the Reach and Reducing the Cost of Broadband 
Deployment by Improving Policies Regarding Public Rights of Way and Wireless Facilities Siting, No. 
11-59, (F.C.C. 2011), available at http://ecfsdocs.fcc.gov/filings/2011/09/30/6016843616.html 
(encouraging the FCC to use its authority “to regulate the public rights-of-way and wireless facilities 
siting process” and recommending that the FCC “open a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking . . . and 
explore further enforceable regulatory action”). 
321 See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
322 See Peter Behr, DOE Shelves Controversial Plan to Hand Off ‘National Corridor’ Power Line 
Role to FERC, CLIMATEWIRE (Oct. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2011/10/12/archive/4?terms=DOE+shelves+controversial+plan 
(reporting that the Department of Energy Secretary abandoned the Obama administration’s proposal to 
delegate the authority to designate “National Interest Energy Transmission Corridors” to FERC).  
323 Id.  
324 Constrained by the FPA from making siting decisions on private land, the DOI has taken a 
much more active role in siting transmission lines on federal lands.  Section 368 of the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 directs the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, and the Interior to 
designate under their respective authorities corridors on federal land in eleven western states for oil, 
gas, and hydrogen pipelines, as well as electricity transmission and distribution facilities.  WEST-WIDE 
ENERGY CORRIDOR PROGRAMMATIC EIS INFO. CTR., http://corridoreis.anl.gov/ (last visited July 1, 
2012).  In 2011, DOI entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with several other federal agencies 
for the purpose of “expedit[ing] the siting and construction of qualified electric transmission 
infrastructure in the United States.”  MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE COUNCIL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, THE ADVISORY 
COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, AND DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, REGARDING 
COORDINATION IN FEDERAL AGENCY REVIEW OF ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION FACILITIES ON FEDERAL 
LAND 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/ceq/Transmission%20Siting%20on%20Federal%20Lands
%20MOU.pdf.  Under the MOU, DOI is the point of contact for companies applying for permits to 
build transmission lines on public lands and national forests.  Id. at 9. 
325 NAT’L COMM’N ON ENERGY POLICY, SITING CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE: AN 
OVERVIEW OF NEEDS AND CHALLENGES 1 (2006), available at 
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push towards federal intervention may grow.  But if states continue to 
voluntarily centralize the power over siting through regional organizations, 
the need for federal intervention may diminish.  One study, conducted by 
Edison Electric Institute,
326
 forecasts that investor-owned utilities will 
invest approximately $64 billion in future transmission systems through 
the year 2022.
327
  
And for generation, states continue to chime in when agencies seem to 
exert their influence too close into their realm.  Where the states feel 
threatened by federal actions, they are more likely to dig in their heels to 
oppose any tip in the balance of power.  For example, when FERC issued 
its recent Order 1000, commenters raised concerns about its federalism 
impacts, making a point to reiterate that “the FPA gives the Commission 
no authority to determine what resources should be used by load-serving 
entities, regardless of whether or not those resources are needed to meet 
public policy requirements.”328  Others commented that “the Final Rule 
should make explicit that any provisions do not impede or interfere with 
state commission authority to accept or approve integrated resource plans, 
make decisions about generation, demand-side resources, resource 
portfolios, or to modify policy based on cost thresholds.”329  States have 
drawn a line in the sand about the inability of the federal government to 
affect directly the type of generation used by the states.   
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article provides a number of insights for continuing discussions 
about tips from state to federal control.  For those resistant to tips from 
state to federal control, they should not take comfort in the fact that the 
area has “traditionally” been regulated at the local level.  They should not 
be overconfident that the historical dominance of the states will be 
sufficient to thwart efforts to enhance federal power.  More is needed to 
insulate state power from a tip toward enhanced federal control.  Any 
potential dangers to the country should be minimized.  The industry should 
                                                                                                                          
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Siting%20Critical%20Energy%20Infrastructure_448851db
5fa7d.pdf. 
326 Edison Electric Institute is the association of U.S. Shareholder-Owned Electric Companies.  Its 
members serve 95% of the ultimate customers in the shareholder-owned segment of the industry, and 
represent 70% of the U.S. electric power industry. About EEI, EDISON ELEC. INST., 
http://www.eei.org/whoweare/abouteei/Pages/default.aspx (last visited July 1, 2012).  
327 EDISON ELEC. INST., TRANSMISSION PROJECTS: AT A GLANCE iv (2012), available at 
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/ElectricityTransmission/Documents/Trans_Project_lowres.pdf.  
328 Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public 
Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,872–73 (Aug. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
329 Id. at 49,872.  But see id. at 49,858 (stating that many commenters defended FERC’s 
jurisdiction, with one noting that “courts have consistently recognized the Commission’s need to adjust 
its regulation under the FPA to meet the changing needs of the industry”). 
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not complain about its diverse regulatory burdens.  The states should 
collaborate to resolve any disputes.  Sub-federal entities should work to 
streamline their permitting processes.  There may even be some merit in 
allowing administrative agencies to exercise “creative” interpretations 
within their existing authority, even if they implicate the balance of power.  
Where these actions are taken with respect for state sovereignty, they may 
be able to alleviate growing tensions over national issues without 
warranting a congressional tip.
330
  But by the same token, pro-state 
authority advocates should highlight callous federal actions that fail to 
respect state sovereignty. 
For those in support of tips towards more federal power, they should 
not be dissuaded by the fact that the area had traditionally been under the 
control of the sub-federal entities.  It is also not enough to point to an 
outdated law that fails to conform to contemporary realities.  It is not even 
enough that the area implicates interstate issues.  More is needed to elicit a 
tip toward enhanced federal control.  Any dangers posed to the country by 
leaving the issue in sub-federal hands should be emphasized.  The 
regulated industry should coordinate and determine whether there is 
enough common ground to present a unified front.  Interstate disputes, 
delays, and economic inefficiencies should be highlighted.  Administrative 
agencies should refrain from “creative” interpretations within their existing 
authority that unduly disrupt the balance of power, highlighting any gaps in 
federal control.  And perhaps most important, any move toward an 
enhanced federal role should be respectful of state sovereignty and craft a 
method of tipping that preserves as much local control as possible while 
effecting the changes needed.
331
  In the end, although all of the regimes 
share traditionally local roots, federalism theory justifications arguing for 
both centralized and decentralized control, and complicated politics, the 
disparity in control may be distinguished based on the lack of alternative 
outlets for federal agencies to affect the earlier siting decisions and the 
multiple avenues that federal agencies have to affect the type of electricity 
                                                                                                                          
330 For instance, the language in the Telecommunications Act reveals a delicate balance between 
Congress’s desire to encourage the growth of the industry and efforts to avoid restricting state and local 
authority over siting of telecommunication towers.  Eagle, supra note 111, at 463–64. 
331 Even where strong arguments can be made that an Administration desires a federal policy, 
however, the Supreme Court has noted that “desirability for a federal policy is not a sufficient reason to 
oust state regulation.”  Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the 
Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1735 (2001) (citing Louisiana Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 370 (1986)).  Furthermore, an assessment of “federal desirability” is 
complicated by the multi-faceted nature of the federal government.  For instance, even though the 
Obama Administration desires renewable energy, Congress has recently proposed cuts to renewable 
subsidies and other incentives, which might argue against “federal desirability.”  See  Philip J. Weiser, 
Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 34 (1999) 
(stating that in the absence of a “clearly superior” policy, Congress should not dictate to the states a 
particular approach to telecommunications regulation). 
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that is developed under state and local jurisdiction.  Expanding future 
federalism discussions to include consideration of such variables can lead 
to a richer and more satisfying analysis.  
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